This paper proposes as a solution concept for games sets of Nash equilibria that are stable against replacement by alternative Nash equilibria. We prove existence, examine some variants that are related to evolutionary solution concepts, and, most importantly, offer a unified approach to predicting outcomes in sender-receiver games with imperfect incentive alignment. We strenghten predictions under partial common interest conditions as well as reject uninformative equilibria in Crawford and Sobel's parametric model of preference similarity.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Iowa, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
97-11.
Length: 31 pages Date of creation: 1997 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:uia:iowaec:97-11
Contact details of provider: Postal: University of Iowa, Department of Economics, Henry B. Tippie College of Business, Iowa City, Iowa 52242 Phone: (319) 335-0829 Fax: (319) 335-1956 Web page: http://tippie.uiowa.edu/economics/ More information through EDIRC
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Renea Jay).
Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games