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Cheap talk with simultaneous versus sequential messages

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  • Gurdal, Mehmet Y.
  • Ozdogan, Ayca
  • Saglam, Ismail

Abstract

Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling and excessive trust in one sender/one receiver cheap talk games with an essentially unique and babbling equilibrium. We extend this setup by adding a second sender into the play and study the behavior of the players both theoretically and experimentally. We examine games where senders are assumed to communicate with the receiver either simultaneously or sequentially as well as a game where the receiver chooses one of these two communication methods. The theoretical predictions for truth-telling, non-conflicting messages observed and trust frequencies are the same for both the simultaneous and sequential plays; however, we observe systematic differences between the treatments of these plays. While the truth-telling frequencies stay above the theoretical prediction of the one half during all the experiments, the nature of truth-telling seems to differ between sequential and simultaneous plays. Under simultaneous communication, the messages of senders are non-conflictive more than half of the time, while the non-conflicting messages are significantly more likely to be correct than not. The frequency of non-conflicting messages is lower under sequential plays due to the tendency of the second sender to revert the message of the first sender. We observe that subjects who prefer to get non-conflicting messages prefer simultaneous mode of communication more often. When acting as senders, these subjects also adjust their truth-telling frequencies so as to generate conflictive messages.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 45727.

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Date of creation: 01 Apr 2013
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:45727

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Keywords: Strategic information transmission; truth-telling; trust; sender-receiver game.;

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References

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  1. Mehmet Y. Gurdal & Ayca Ozdogan & Ismail Saglam, 2011. "Truth-Telling and Trust in Sender-Receiver Games with Intervention," Working Papers, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics 1106, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics.
  2. V. Crawford & J. Sobel, 2010. "Strategic Information Transmission," Levine's Working Paper Archive 544, David K. Levine.
  3. Alistair J. Wilson & Emanuel Vespa, 2012. "Communication With Multiple Senders and Multiple Dimensions: An Experiment," Working Papers, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics 401, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2012.
  4. Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 384-394, March.
  5. Ambrus, Attila & Takahashi, Satoru, 2008. "Multi-sender cheap talk with restricted state spaces," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 3(1), March.
  6. Peeters, Ronald & Vorsatz, Marc & Walzl, Markus, 2007. "Rewards in an Experimental Sender-Receiver Game," Research Memorandum 019, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  7. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Working Papers, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics. 154, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics..
  8. Matthias Sutter, 2007. "Deception through telling the truth?! Experimental evidence from individuals and teams," Working Papers 2007-26, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.
  9. Sanchez-Pages, Santiago & Vorsatz, Marc, 2007. "An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 86-112, October.
  10. Peeters, Ronald & Vorsatz, Marc & Walzl, Markus, 2007. "Truth, trust, and sanctions: On institutional selection in sender-receiver games," Research Memorandum 034, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  11. Marco Battaglini, 1999. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1295, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  12. Battaglini Marco, 2004. "Policy Advice with Imperfectly Informed Experts," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 4(1), pages 1-34, April.
  13. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
  14. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1986. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, Spring.
  15. Santiago Sánchez-Pagés & Marc Vorsatz, 2009. "Enjoy the silence: an experiment on truth-telling," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 220-241, June.
  16. Ming Li, 2008. "Two (talking) heads are not better than one," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(63), pages 1-8.
  17. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2008:i:63:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Alistair J. Wilson & Emanuel Vespa, 2012. "Communication With Multiple Senders and Multiple Dimensions: An Experiment," Working Papers, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics 384, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2012.
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