Communication With Multiple Senders and Multiple Dimensions: An Experiment
AbstractWe implement the Battaglini (2002) model of multi-sender-multi-dimension cheap talk in the laboratory, analyzing the effects of sender competition on information transmission. Our results indicate that competing senders provide enough information for close to full revelation, but receiver's ability to use this information crucially depends on senders' biases. Receivers are close to full extraction when biases identify an ex-ante trustworthy sender. When there is no ex-ante trustworthy source, full exploitation of messages sent requires the use the information inferred across dimensions. However, receivers seem to treat dimensions as separate choices, and are much closer to best-responding within each separate dimension.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 384.
Date of creation: Mar 2012
Date of revision: Mar 2012
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-07-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2009-07-11 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2009-07-11 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2009-07-11 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2009-07-11 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2009-07-11 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-NET-2009-07-11 (Network Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2009-07-11 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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