Truth-Telling and Trust in Sender-Receiver Games with Intervention
AbstractRecent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling in strategic information transmission games with conflictive preferences. In this paper, we show that this phenomenon is more pronounced in sender-receiver games where a truthful regulator randomly intervenes. We also establish that intervention significantly increases the excessive trust of receivers.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1106.
Date of creation: Oct 2011
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Ismail Saglam & Mehmet Y. Gurdal & Ayca Ozdogan, 2011. "Truth-telling and Trust in Sender-receiver Games with Intervention," KoÃ§ University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1123, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-10-15 (All new papers)
- NEP-EVO-2011-10-15 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2011-10-15 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-10-15 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2011-10-15 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2011-10-15 (Microeconomics)
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