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Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game

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Author Info
Peeters, Ronald
Vorsatz, Marc
Walzl, Markus

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Abstract

We conducted an experiment in which subjects played a sender-receiver game with and without rewarding opportunities. We find that rewards enhance the receiver's propensity to trust the sender's message but do not influence the sender's probability to tell the truth. Moreover, subjects who reward tell the truth and trust more often in the presence and absence of rewarding opportunities.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V84-4T2M5S9-1/2/2420327bff88d45c4dbbde6a9c8c7aa5
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 101 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 148-150
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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:101:y:2008:i:2:p:148-150

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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Related research
Keywords: Experiment Rewards Strategic information transmission;

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  1. Klaus, Bettina & Klijn, Flip & Walzl, Markus, 2008. "Stochastic Stability for Roommate Markets," Research Memoranda 010, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.

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