Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Pinocchio's Pupil: Using Eyetracking and Pupil Dilation to Understand Truth-telling and Deception in Games

Contents:

Author Info

  • Joseph Tao-yi Wang
  • Michael Spezio
  • Colin F. Camerer

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~camerer/pinocchio2.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 321307000000000042.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 14 May 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000042

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.dklevine.com/

Related research

Keywords:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. John W. Dickhaut & Kevin A. McCabe & Arijit Mukherji, 1995. "An experimental study of strategicinformation transmission," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 389-403.
  2. Vincent P. Crawford, 2003. "Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 133-149, March.
  3. Uri Gneezy, 2005. "Deception: The Role of Consequences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 384-394, March.
  4. Blume, A. & DeJong, D.V. & Kim, Y-G. & Sprinkle, G., 1997. "Evolution of Communication With Partial Common Interest," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1997-115, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  5. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November.
  6. Richard Mckelvey & Thomas Palfrey, 1998. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Extensive Form Games," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 9-41, June.
  7. Marco Ottaviani & Francesco Squintani, 2002. "Non-Fully Strategic Information Transmission," Wallis Working Papers, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy WP29, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
  8. Colin F. Camerer & Teck-Hua Ho & Juin-Kuan Chong, 2004. "A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 119(3), pages 861-898, August.
  9. Brian A. Jacob & Steven D. Levitt, 2003. "Rotten Apples: An Investigation Of The Prevalence And Predictors Of Teacher Cheating," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 118(3), pages 843-877, August.
  10. Lin, Hsiou-wei & McNichols, Maureen F., 1998. "Underwriting relationships, analysts' earnings forecasts and investment recommendations," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 101-127, February.
  11. Michaely, Roni & Womack, Kent L, 1999. "Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(4), pages 653-86.
  12. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 284, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  13. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
  14. Costa-Gomes, Miguel & Crawford, Vincent P. & Broseta, Bruno, 1998. "Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, UC San Diego qt1vn4h7x5, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  15. Brennan, Michael J, 2004. "How Did It Happen?," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA qt1047x6kv, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA.
  16. Michael J. Brennan, 2004. "How Did It Happen?," Economic Notes, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA, vol. 33(1), pages 3-22, 02.
  17. Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson & Guillermo Moloche & Stephen Weinberg, 2005. "Information Acquisition: Experimental Analysis of a Boundedly Rational Model," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000480, UCLA Department of Economics.
  18. Cai, Hongbin & Wang, Joseph Tao-Yi, 2006. "Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 7-36, July.
  19. Green, Jerry & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1977. "Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 45(2), pages 427-38, March.
  20. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2003. "The Trouble with Stock Options," NBER Working Papers 9784, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2003. "The Trouble with Stock Options," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 49-70, Summer.
  22. Johnson, Eric J. & Camerer, Colin & Sen, Sankar & Rymon, Talia, 2002. "Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring Information Search in Sequential Bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 16-47, May.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Florian Ederer & Ernst Fehr, 2007. "Deception and Incentives. How Dishonesty Undermines Effort Provision," IEW - Working Papers, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich 341, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  2. Navin Kartik, 2009. "Strategic Communication with Lying Costs," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(4), pages 1359-1395.
  3. Giovanna Devetag & Sibilla Di Guida & Luca Polonio, 2013. "An Eye-Tracking Study of Feature-Based Choice in One-Shot Games," Working Papers ECARES, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles ECARES 2013-06, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  4. Vincent P Crawford, 2007. "Let’s Talk It Over: Coordination Via Preplay Communication With Level-k Thinking," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001449, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Nathan Berg & Donald Lien, 2009. "Sexual orientation and self-reported lying," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 83-104, March.
  6. Timothy Shields, 2008. "Analysts, Incentives, and Exaggeration," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO 2008s-11, CIRANO.
  7. Vincent P. Crawford & Miguel A. Costa-Gomes & Nagore Iriberri, 2010. "Strategic Thinking," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000001148, David K. Levine.
  8. Vincent P. Crawford, 2007. "Look-ups as the Windows of the Strategic Soul: Studying Cognition via Information Search in Game Experiments," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000766, UCLA Department of Economics.
  9. B. Douglas Bernheim, 2008. "On the Potential of Neuroeconomics: A Critical (but Hopeful) Appraisal," NBER Working Papers 13954, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Kawagoe, Toshiji & Takizawa, Hirokazu, 2009. "Equilibrium refinement vs. level-k analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 238-255, May.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:321307000000000042. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (David K. Levine).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.