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Non-Fully Strategic Information Transmission

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Author Info
Marco Ottaviani (London Business School)
Francesco Squintani () (University of Rochester)

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Abstract

Building on Crawford and Sobel's (1982) general communication model, this paper introduces the possibility that players are non-strategic. The sender might be honest, truthfully reporting private information, or the receiver might be naive, blindly implementing the sender's recommendations . In contrast to the predictions of the fully-strategic model, we show that equilibrium communication is inflated but detailed, and that the equilibrium outcome is biased in an ex-ante sense. Our findings are relevant to understanding communication by financial analysts and academic evaluators.

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File URL: http://www.wallis.rochester.edu/WallisPapers/wallis_29.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy in its series Wallis Working Papers with number WP29.

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Length: pages
Date of creation: Oct 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:roc:wallis:wp29

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Postal: UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER, Wallis Institute, HARKNESS 109B ROCHESTER NEW YORK 14627 U.S.A.

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Related research
Keywords: communication; bounded rationality; financial advice; grade inflation;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies

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  1. Philippe Jehiel & Frédéric Koessler, 2006. "Revisiting Games of Incomplete Information with Analogy-Based Expectations," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000252, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Joseph Tao-yi Wang & Michael Spezio & Colin F. Camerer, 2006. "Pinocchio's Pupil: Using Eyetracking and Pupil Dilation to Understand Truth-telling and Deception in Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000042, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Malmendier, Ulrike M. & Shanthikumar, Devin, 2004. "Are Investors Naive about Incentives?," Research Papers 1867, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
  4. Ming Li, 2003. "To Disclose or Not to Disclose: Cheap Talk with Uncertain Biases," Working Papers 04003, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Aug 2004. [Downloadable!]
  5. Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2003. "Ordinal Cheap Talk," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2003-05, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
  6. Archishman Chakraborty & Rick Harbaugh, 2004. "Comparative Cheap Talk," Working Papers 2004-08, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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