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Are Investors Naive About Incentives?

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  • Ulrike Malmendier
  • Devin Shanthikumar

Abstract

Traditional economic analysis of markets with asymmetric information assumes that uninformed agents account for the incentives of informed agents to distort information. We analyze whether investors in the stock market internalize such incentives. Stock recommendations of security analysts are likely to be biased upwards, particularly if the issuing analyst is affiliated with the underwriter of the recommended stock. Using the NYSE Trades and Quotations database, we find that large (institutional) traders account for the upward bias and exert no abnormal trade reaction to buy recommendations, and significant selling pressure in response to hold recommendations. Small (individual) traders do not account for the upward shift and exert significantly positive pressure for buys and zero pressure for hold recommendations. Moreover, large traders discount positive recommendations from affiliated analysts more than from unaffiliated analysts, while small traders do not distinguish between them. The naive trading behavior of small investors induces negative abnormal portfolio returns.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 10812.

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Date of creation: Oct 2004
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Publication status: published as Malmendier, Ulrike and Devin Shanthikumar. "Are Small Investors Naïve About Incentives?" Journal of Financial Economics 85, 2 (August 2007): 457-489.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10812

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  1. Michaely, Roni & Womack, Kent L, 1999. "Conflict of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter Analyst Recommendations," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 12(4), pages 653-86.
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Cited by:
  1. Loh, Roger K. & Stulz, Rene M., 2009. "When Are Analyst Recommendation Changes Influential?," Working Paper Series, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics 2009-7, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
  2. Hamid Mehran & Rene M. Stulz, 2006. "The Economics of Conflicts of Interest in Financial Institutions," NBER Working Papers 12695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Ljungqvist, Alexander P & Marston, Felicia & Starks, Laura T & Wei, Kelsey D. & Yan, Hong, 2005. "Conflicts of Interest in Sell-Side Research and the Moderating Role of Institutional Investors," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5001, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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