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An Experimental Study of Truth-Telling in a Sender-Receiver Game

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Author Info
Santiago Sanchez-Pages ()
Marc Vorsatz

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Abstract

A recent experimental study of Cai and Wang (2003) on strategic information transmission games reveals that subjects tend to transmit more information than predicted by the standard equilibrium analysis. To evidence that this overcommunication phenomenon can be explained in some situations in terms of a tension between normative social behavior and incentives for lying, we show that in a simple sender-receiver game subjects incurring in costs to punish liars tell the truth more often than predicted by the equilibrium analysis whereas subjects that do not punish liars after receiving a deceptive message play equilibrium strategies. Thus, we can partition the subject pool into two groups, one group of subjects with preferences for truth-telling and another group taking into account only economic incentives.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh in its series ESE Discussion Papers with number 128.

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Length: 32
Date of creation: Nov 2004
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Handle: RePEc:edn:esedps:128

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Related research
Keywords: Experiment Sender-Receiver Game Strategic Informa- tion Transmission Truth-Telling.

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Blume, Andreas, et al, 1998. "Experimental Evidence on the Evolution of Meaning of Messages in Sender-Receiver Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1323-40, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Amartya Sen, 1997. "Maximization and the Act of Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 745-780, July.
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  3. Heidhues, Paul & Lagerlof, Johan, 2003. "Hiding information in electoral competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 48-74, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Gal-Or, Esther, 1985. "Information Sharing in Oligopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(2), pages 329-43, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Morgan, John & Stocken, Phillip C, 2003. " An Analysis of Stock Recommendations," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(1), pages 183-203, Spring.
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  6. Rosemarie Nagel & Antoni Bosch-Domènech & Albert Satorra & José García Montalvo, 1999. "One, Two, (Three), Infinity: Newspaper and Lab Beauty-Contest Experiments," Economics Working Papers 438, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  7. John W. Dickhaut & Kevin A. McCabe & Arijit Mukherji, 1995. "An experimental study of strategicinformation transmission," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 389-403.
  8. Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Vincent P. Crawford, 2003. "Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 133-149, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Florian Ederer & Ernst Fehr, 2007. "Deception and Incentives: How Dishonesty Undermines Effort Provision," IZA Discussion Papers 3200, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Santiago Sanchez-Pages & Marc Vorsatz, 2007. "Enjoy the Silence: An Experiment on Truth-Telling," ESE Discussion Papers 155, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
  3. Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, . "Trust, Communication and Contracts: An Experiment," Working Papers 0206, Industrial Relations Center, University of Minnesota (Twin Cities Campus). [Downloadable!]
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