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Truth-telling and Trust in Sender-receiver Games with Intervention

Author

Listed:
  • Ismail Saglam

    () (TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics)

  • Mehmet Y. Gurdal

    () (TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics)

  • Ayca Ozdogan

    () (TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics)

Abstract

Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling in strategic information transmission games with conflictive preferences. In this paper, we show that this phenomenon is more pronounced in sender-receiver games where a truthful regulator randomly intervenes. We also establish that intervention significantly increases the excessive trust of receivers.

Suggested Citation

  • Ismail Saglam & Mehmet Y. Gurdal & Ayca Ozdogan, 2011. "Truth-telling and Trust in Sender-receiver Games with Intervention," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1123, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
  • Handle: RePEc:koc:wpaper:1123
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sanchez-Pages, Santiago & Vorsatz, Marc, 2007. "An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 86-112, October.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Gurdal, Mehmet Y. & Ozdogan, Ayca & Saglam, Ismail, 2013. "Cheap talk with simultaneous versus sequential messages," MPRA Paper 45727, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Strategic information transmission; truth-telling; trust; sender-receiver game.;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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