An experimental study of strategicinformation transmission
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- Toshiji Kawagoe & Hirokazu Takizawa, 2005. "Why Lying Pays: Truth Bias in the Communication with Conflicting Interests," Experimental 0503005, EconWPA.
- Mehmet Y. Gurdal & Ayca Ozdogan & Ismail Saglam, 2011.
"Truth-Telling and Trust in Sender-Receiver Games with Intervention,"
1106, TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics.
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- Timothy Shields, 2008. "Analysts, Incentives, and Exaggeration," CIRANO Working Papers 2008s-11, CIRANO.
- Joseph Tao-yi Wang & Michael Spezio & Colin F. Camerer, 2006. "Pinocchio's Pupil: Using Eyetracking and Pupil Dilation to Understand Truth-telling and Deception in Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000042, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Toshiji Kawagoe & Hirokazu Takizawa, 2005. "Why Lying Pays: Truth Bias in the Communication with Conflicting Interests," Discussion papers 05018, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
- Sanchez-Pages, Santiago & Vorsatz, Marc, 2007.
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Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 86-112, October.
- Santiago Sanchez-Pages & Marc Vorsatz, 2004. "An Experimental Study of Truth-Telling in a Sender-Receiver Game," ESE Discussion Papers 128, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
- Rode, Julian, 2007. "Truth and Trust in Communication: An Experimental Study of Behavior under Asymmetric Information," Ratio Working Papers 111, The Ratio Institute.
- Ederer, Florian & Fehr, Ernst, 2007.
"Deception and Incentives: How Dishonesty Undermines Effort Provision,"
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3200, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Florian Ederer & Ernst Fehr, 2007. "Deception and Incentives. How Dishonesty Undermines Effort Provision," IEW - Working Papers 341, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Santiago Sánchez-Pagés & Marc Vorsatz, 2009. "Enjoy the silence: an experiment on truth-telling," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 12(2), pages 220-241, June.
- Sean Duffy & Tyson Hartwig & John Smith, 2014.
"Costly and discrete communication: an experimental investigation,"
Theory and Decision,
Springer, vol. 76(3), pages 395-417, March.
- Duffy, Sean & Hartwig, Tyson & Smith, John, 2010. "Costly and discrete communication: An experimental investigation," MPRA Paper 24148, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Duffy, Sean & Hartwig, Tyson & Smith, John, 2011. "Costly and discrete communication: An experimental investigation," MPRA Paper 30914, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Marco Ottaviani & Francesco Squintani, 2006. "Naive audience and communication bias," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(1), pages 129-150, December.
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