Truth-Telling and Trust in Sender-Receiver Games with Intervention
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- Ismail Saglam & Mehmet Y. Gurdal & Ayca Ozdogan, 2011. "Truth-telling and Trust in Sender-receiver Games with Intervention," Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers 1123, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum.
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Cited by:
- Gurdal, Mehmet Y. & Ozdogan, Ayca & Saglam, Ismail, 2013. "Cheap talk with simultaneous versus sequential messages," MPRA Paper 45727, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EVO-2011-10-15 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2011-10-15 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-10-15 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2011-10-15 (History and Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2011-10-15 (Microeconomics)
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