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Truth-Telling and Trust in Sender-Receiver Games with Intervention

  • Mehmet Y. Gurdal
  • Ayca Ozdogan
  • Ismail Saglam

Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling in strategic information transmission games with conflictive preferences. In this paper, we show that this phenomenon is more pronounced in sender-receiver games where a truthful regulator randomly intervenes. We also establish that intervention significantly increases the excessive trust of receivers.

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Paper provided by TOBB University of Economics and Technology, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1106.

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Date of creation: Oct 2011
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Handle: RePEc:tob:wpaper:1106
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  1. Gilligan, Thomas W & Krehbiel, Keith, 1987. "Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 287-335, Fall.
  2. Peeters Ronald & Vorsatz Marc & Walzl Markus, 2007. "Rewards in an Experimental Sender-Receiver Game," Research Memorandum 019, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  3. Crawford, Vincent P., 2001. "Lying for Strategic Advantage: Rational and Boundedly Rational Misrepresentation of Intentions," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt6k65014s, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  4. Marco Ottaviani & Francesco Squintani, 2002. "Non-Fully Strategic Information Transmission," Wallis Working Papers WP29, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
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  9. Santiago Sanchez-Pages & Marc Vorsatz, 2004. "An Experimental Study of Truth-Telling in a Sender-Receiver Game," ESE Discussion Papers 128, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  10. Fiorina, Morris P, 1987. "Comment: Alternative Rationales for Restrictive Procedures [Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures]," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 337-43, Fall.
  11. Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
  12. Broseta, Bruno & Costa-Gomes, Miguel & Crawford, Vincent P., 2000. "Cognition and Behavior in Normal-Form Games: An Experimental Study," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt0fp8278k, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
  13. Massimiliano Landi & Domenico Colucci, 2006. "Rational and Boundedly Rational Behavior in Sender-receiver Games," Development Economics Working Papers 22460, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
  14. John W. Dickhaut & Kevin A. McCabe & Arijit Mukherji, 1995. "An experimental study of strategicinformation transmission," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 389-403.
  15. Santiago Sánchez-Pagés & Marc Vorsatz, 2009. "Enjoy the silence: an experiment on truth-telling," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 220-241, June.
  16. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November.
  17. Stahl, Dale II & Wilson, Paul W., 1994. "Experimental evidence on players' models of other players," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 309-327, December.
  18. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July.
  19. Cai, Hongbin & Wang, Joseph Tao-Yi, 2006. "Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 7-36, July.
  20. Jordi Blanes, 2003. "Credibility and Cheap Talk of Securities Analysts:Theory and Evidence," FMG Discussion Papers dp472, Financial Markets Group.
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