Costly and discrete communication: An experimental investigation
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- Sean Duffy & Tyson Hartwig & John Smith, 2014. "Costly and discrete communication: an experimental investigation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(3), pages 395-417, March.
- Duffy, Sean & Hartwig, Tyson & Smith, John, 2010. "Costly and discrete communication: An experimental investigation," MPRA Paper 24148, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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Cited by:
- Johanna Hertel & John Smith, 2013.
"Not so cheap talk: costly and discrete communication,"
Theory and Decision,
Springer, vol. 75(2), pages 267-291, August.
- Hertel, Johanna & Smith, John, 2010. "Not so cheap talk: Costly and discrete communication," MPRA Paper 23560, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Hertel, Johanna & Smith, John, 2011. "Not so cheap talk: Costly and discrete communication," MPRA Paper 29148, University Library of Munich, Germany.
More about this item
Keywords
information transmission; cheap talk; overcommunication; bounded rationality; experimental game theory;JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-ALL-2011-05-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2011-05-24 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EXP-2011-05-24 (Experimental Economics)
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