Communication With Multiple Senders: An Experiment
Abstract
We implement a model of multi-sender cheap talk in the laboratory that allows for full transfer of information as an equilibrium outcome. Our experiment therefore analyzes the potential for more informative debate with cheap talk when senders statements can be contrasted and compared. Results indicate that competing senders do provide enough information for close to full revelation, but receiver's ability to use this information crucially depends on senders' biases. Receivers are close to full extraction when biases identify an ex-ante trustworthy sender. When there is no ex-ante trustworthy source, fully exploiting information requires receivers to endogenously infer trustworthiness from messages and use this inference consistently. Our results suggest that receivers too narrowly frame the problem, identifying trustworthy sources but failing to fully take advantage of that information.Download Info
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Paper provided by University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 461.Length:
Date of creation: Apr 2012
Date of revision: Sep 2012
Handle: RePEc:pit:wpaper:461
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Related research
Keywords: Multiple Senders; Strategic Information Transmission; Experiment; Recommendations;Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-04-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2012-04-23 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EXP-2012-04-23 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2012-04-23 (Game Theory)
References
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- Takahashi, Satoru & Ambrus, Attila, 2008.
"Multi-Sender Cheap Talk with Restricted State Spaces,"
Scholarly Articles
3200263, Harvard University Department of Economics.
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