Plausibility of Signals by a Heterogeneous Committee
AbstractKrishna and Morgan (2001a) propose "amendments" to two of Gilligan and Krehbiel's (1987, 1988) theoretical studies of legislative signaling. The new results for homogeneous committees do not significantly change the empirical expectations of prior works, but the results for heterogeneous committees contradict earlier claims. With primary attention to heterogeneous committees, this note compares and contrasts the new and old equilibria and their empirical implications. The notion of signaling is somewhat nebulous in all such games but seems distinctively less plausible in the key Krishna-Morgan proposition than in prior legislative signaling games. Furthermore, the empirical literature on choice of rules-specifically, the positive relationship between committee heterogeneity and restrictive rules-is inconsistent with the Krishna-Morgan analysis but consistent with Gilligan-Krehbiel analyses, even though the former are informationally efficient while the latter are not.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Stanford University, Graduate School of Business in its series Research Papers with number 1678.
Date of creation: Feb 2001
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- Gilligan, Thomas W & Krehbiel, Keith, 1987. "Collective Decisionmaking and Standing Committees: An Informational Rationale for Restrictive Amendment Procedures," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 287-335, Fall.
- Gilligan, Thomas W & Krehbiel, Keith, 1997. "Specialization Decisions within Committee," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(2), pages 366-86, October.
- Randall Holcombe & Dmitry Ryvkin, 2010. "Policy errors in executive and legislative decision-making," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 144(1), pages 37-51, July.
- Ambrus, Attila & Azevedo, Eduardo M. & Kamada, Yuichiro & Takagi, Yuki, 2013. "Legislative committees as information intermediaries: A unified theory of committee selection and amendment rules," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 103-115.
- Oliver Board, 2006. "Expert Advice with Multiple Decision Makers," Working Papers 242, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2006.
- Keith Krehbiel, 2004. "Legislative Organization," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 113-128, Winter.
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