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A Theory of Influence: The Strategic Value of Public Ignorance

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  • Isabelle Brocas
  • Juan D. Carrillo
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    Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series Levine's Bibliography with number 172782000000000068.

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    Date of creation: 05 Apr 2005
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    Handle: RePEc:cla:levrem:172782000000000068

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    1. Godfrey Keller & Sven Rady, 1998. "Optimal Experimentation in a Changing Environment," Game Theory and Information, EconWPA 9801001, EconWPA.
    2. Jean Tirole, 1985. "Hierarchies and Bureaucracies," Working papers, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics 363, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    3. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
    4. Crémer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad, 1991. "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 5, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
    5. Mathias Dewatripont, 2006. "Transferable control," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9649, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    6. Dewatripont, Mathias, 1988. "Commitment through Renegotiation-Proof Contracts with Third Parties," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(3), pages 377-89, July.
    7. Patrick Bolton & Christopher Harris, 1999. "Strategic Experimentation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 67(2), pages 349-374, March.
    8. Kofman, Fred & Lawarree, Jacques, 1996. "On the optimality of allowing collusion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 383-407, September.
    9. Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, 1986. "Relying on the Information of Interested Parties," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 18-32, Spring.
    10. Aghion, Philippe, et al, 1991. "Optimal Learning by Experimentation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(4), pages 621-54, July.
    11. Gromb, Denis & Martimort, David, 2004. "The Organization of Delegated Expertise," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 4572, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Anthony M. Marino & John G. Matsusaka, 2005. "Decision Processes, Agency Problems, and Information: An Economic Analysis of Capital Budgeting Procedures," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 18(1), pages 301-325.
    13. Aghion, P. & Bolton, P. & Harris, C. & Jullien, B., 1990. "Optimal Learning By Experimentation," DELTA Working Papers, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) 90-10, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
    14. Rey, Patrick & Dewatripont, Mathias & Aghion, Philippe, 2004. "Transferable Control," Scholarly Articles 4481511, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    15. Wei Li, 2004. "Mind Changes in the Design of Reporting Protocols," Theory workshop papers, UCLA Department of Economics 658612000000000085, UCLA Department of Economics.
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