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Monetary Policy, Delegation and Polarization

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Christian Schultz

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Abstract

This paper studies the relation between political polarization and delegation of stabilization policy. There is asymmetric information about how the economy works: unlike voters, two political parties know the variance of an employment shock. Prior to an election each party proposes a central banker to be chosen if the party wins. If political polarization is small, voters will learn the true variance and the central banker and the stabilization policy are the ones most preferred by the median voter. If the political polarization is high, stabilization policy does not reflect the variance but only the preferences of the winning party.

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Paper provided by Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series EPRU Working Paper Series with number 98-19.

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Handle: RePEc:kud:epruwp:98-19

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  1. repec:dgr:uvatin:20040035 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Debora Di Gioacchino & Sergio Ginebri & Laura Sabani, 2004. "Political support for anti-inflationary monetary policy," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 9(2), pages 187-200. [Downloadable!]
  3. Wolfgang Eggert & Martin Kolmar, . "Contests with Size Effects," EPRU Working Paper Series 02-04, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Gianmaria MARTINI & Cinzia ROVESTI, 2004. "Antitrust policy and price collusion : public agencies vs delegation," Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) 2004021, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). [Downloadable!]
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  5. Frank Bohn, 2002. "Eliminating the Inflationary Finance Trap in a Politically Unstable Country: Domestic Politics versus International Pressure," Economics Discussion Papers 551, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Wolfgang Eggert & Laszlo Goerke, . "Fiscal Policy, Economic Integration and Unemployment," EPRU Working Paper Series 02-05, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Silvia Dominguez-Martinez & Otto Swank, 2006. "Polarization, Information Collection and Electoral Control," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 527-545, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Paul Heidhues & Johan Lagerlöf, 2000. "Hiding Information in Electoral Competition," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-06, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG), revised Feb 2002. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Frank Bohn, 2002. "Public Finance under Political Instability and Debt Conditionality," Economics Discussion Papers 540, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Wolfgang Eggert & Martin Kolmar, . "Information Sharing, Multiple Nash Equilibria, and Asymmetric Capital-Tax Competition," EPRU Working Paper Series 02-01, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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