Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Antitrust policy and price collusion : public agencies vs delegation

Contents:

Author Info

  • Gianmaria MARTINI

    (Department of Management and Information Technology, University of Bergamo)

  • Cinzia ROVESTI

    (Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Roma)

Abstract

This paper investigates the effectiveness of antitrust policy in fighting horizontal collusion under different regimes of policy implementation. We consider two regimes : a public agency regime, where an antitrust authority is in charge of competition policy, and a "delegation" regime, where the policy is chosen by consumers. In both regimes the policy is implemented under discretion. The analysis shows that delegation dominates, both in case of complete and imperfect information about production costs, the public agency regime because consumers credibly start off an higher level of investigation activity than the public agency. This resuit implies that the public agency will fight the cases involving "relevant" anti-competitive activities, while consumers will act also against "minor" violations. The combination of the two regimes yields an higher welfare than having only a public agency in charge of competition policy, because consumers can partially relax the agency's limited resources constraint.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://sites.uclouvain.be/econ/DP/REL/2004021.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES) in its series Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain) with number 2004021.

as in new window
Length: 16
Date of creation: 01 Jun 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2004021

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Place Montesquieu 3, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)
Fax: +32 10473945
Email:
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/ires
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Antitrust policy; Horizontal collusion; Delegation; Policy regimes;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
  2. Saïd Souam, 1997. "Optimal Antitrust Policy Under Different Regimes of Fines," Working Papers, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique 97-37, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  3. Besanko, David & Spulber, Daniel F, 1990. "Are Treble Damages Neutral? Sequential Equilibrium and Private Antitrust Enforcement," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 870-87, September.
  4. Salant, Stephen W, 1987. "Treble Damage Awards in Private Lawsuits for Price Fixing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(6), pages 1326-36, December.
  5. Christian Schultz, . "Monetary Policy, Delegation and Polarization," EPRU Working Paper Series, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics 98-19, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  6. Massimo Motta & Michele Polo, . "Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," Working Papers, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University 150, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  7. Besanko, David & Spulber, Daniel F, 1989. "Delegated Law Enforcement and Noncooperative Behavior," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 5(1), pages 25-52, Spring.
  8. Bizjak, John M & Coles, Jeffrey L, 1995. "The Effect of Private Antitrust Litigation on the Stock-Market Valuation of the Firm," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 436-61, June.
  9. Banks, Jeffrey S, 1992. "Monopoly Pricing and Regulatory Oversight," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 203-33, Spring.
  10. Andreoni, J. & Erard, B. & Feinstein, J., 1996. "Tax Compliance," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems 9610r, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  11. Ross, Thomas W, 1984. "Winners and Losers under the Robinson-Patman Act," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(2), pages 243-71, October.
  12. Besanko, David & Spulber, Daniel F, 1989. "Antitrust Enforcement under Asymmetric Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(396), pages 408-25, June.
  13. Saïd Souam, 1998. "Dissuasion de la collusion et efficacité de deux systèmes d'amendes," Revue économique, Presses de Sciences-Po, Presses de Sciences-Po, vol. 0(3), pages 755-765.
  14. Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1986. "Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(3), pages 739-60, October.
  15. Mailath George J. & Okuno-Fujiwara Masahiro & Postlewaite Andrew, 1993. "Belief-Based Refinements in Signalling Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 241-276, August.
  16. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-89, November.
  17. Block, Michael Kent & Nold, Frederick Carl, 1981. "The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(3), pages 429-45, June.
  18. Block, Michael K & Feinstein, Jonathan S, 1986. "The Spillover Effect of Antitrust Enforcement," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 68(1), pages 122-31, February.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Bourjade, Sylvain & Rey, Patrick & Seabright, Paul, 2009. "Private Antitrust Enforcement in the Presence of Pre-Trial Bargaining," TSE Working Papers, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) 09-041, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  2. Schwartz, Warren F. & Wickelgren, Abraham L., 2011. "Optimal antitrust enforcement: Competitor suits, entry, and post-entry competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 967-972.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ctl:louvre:2004021. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sebastien SCHILLINGS).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.