• NEP-ALL-2005-09-29 (All new papers)
• NEP-COM-2005-09-29 (Industrial Competition)
• NEP-MIC-2005-09-29 (Microeconomics)
• NEP-REG-2005-09-29 (Regulation)

1. Joseph E Harrington, 2001. "Optimal Cartel Pricing in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority," Economics Working Paper Archive 460, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Jul 2002. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Joseph E. Harrington, 2005. "Optimal Cartel Pricing In The Presence Of An Antitrust Authority," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 46(1), pages 145-169, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Porter, Robert H & Zona, J Douglas, 1993. "Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 518-38, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, 1992. "Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions," NBER Working Papers 4013, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Cramton, Peter & Schwartz, Jesse A, 2000. "Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 229-52, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Peter Cramton & Jesse Schwartz, 2000. "Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions," Papers of Peter Cramton 00jre, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Mar 1999. [Downloadable!]
4. Bresnahan, Timothy F, 1987. "Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile Industry: The 1955 Price War," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 35(4), pages 457-82, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Christie, William G. & Schultz, Paul H., 1999. "The initiation and withdrawal of odd-eighth quotes among Nasdaq stocks: an empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 409-442, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, 1999. "Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 263-288, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, 1997. "Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding," NBER Working Papers 6037, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Bolotova, Yuliya & Connor, John M. & Miller, Douglas J., 2005. "The Impact of Collusion on Price Behavior: Empirical Results from Two Recent Cases," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19164, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Bolotova, Yuliya & Connor, John M. & Miller, Douglas J., 2008. "The impact of collusion on price behavior: Empirical results from two recent cases," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1290-1307, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Kyle Bagwell & Robert Staiger, 1997. "Collusion Over the Business Cycle," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(1), pages 82-106, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1995. "Collusion Over the Business Cycle," Discussion Papers 1118, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
   • Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1995. "Collusion over the Business Cycle," NBER Working Papers 5056, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, 1998. "Testing Static Oligopoly Models: Conduct and Cost in the Sugar Industry, 1890-1914," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(2), pages 355-377, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Philippe Cyrenne, 1999. "On Antitrust Enforcement and the Deterrence of Collusive Behaviour," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 257-272, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Andreas Blume & Paul Heidhues, 2008. "Modeling Tacit Collusion in Auctions," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(1), pages 163-184, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. John Haltiwanger & Joseph E. Harrington Jr., 1991. "The Impact of Cyclical Demand Movements on Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(1), pages 89-106, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Christie, William G & Schultz, Paul H, 1994. " Why Do NASDAQ Market Makers Avoid Odd-Eighth Quotes?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(5), pages 1813-40, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Chu, Chia-Shang James & Stinchcombe, Maxwell & White, Halbert, 1996. "Monitoring Structural Change," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(5), pages 1045-65, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M. & Froeb, Luke M. & Geweke, John & Taylor, Christopher T., 2006. "A variance screen for collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 467-486, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Kandori, Michihiro, 1991. "Correlated Demand Shocks and Price Wars during Booms," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 58(1), pages 171-80, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., 2003. "Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority," Computing in Economics and Finance 2003 26, Society for Computational Economics.
    Other versions:
    • Joseph E Harrington Jr, 2002. "Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority," Economics Working Paper Archive 487, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised May 2003. [Downloadable!]
    • Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., 2004. "Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(4), pages 651-673, Winter.
18. Glenn Ellison, 1994. "Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 37-57, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Bresnahan, Timothy F., 1989. "Empirical studies of industries with market power," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 17, pages 1011-1057 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
20. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2002. "Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals and Communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 102(1), pages 229-248, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. Helder Vasconcelos, 2005. "Tacit Collusion, Cost Asymmetries, and Mergers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(1), pages 39-62, Spring.
22. Kai-Uwe Kühn, 2001. "Fighting collusion by regulating communication between firms," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 16(32), pages 167-204, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
23. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Green, Edward J. & Porter, Robert H., 1982. "Noncooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information," Working Papers 367, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
24. Mailath, George J. & Zemsky, Peter, 1991. "Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 467-486, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
25. Carl Davidson & Raymond Deneckere, 1984. "Excess Capacity and Collusion," Discussion Papers 675, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Davidson, Carl & Deneckere, Raymond J, 1990. "Excess Capacity and Collusion," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(3), pages 521-41, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
26. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1987. "Dynamic Duopoly: Prices and Quantities," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(1), pages 23-35, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
27. Pesendorfer, Martin, 2000. "A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(3), pages 381-411, July.
28. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 107-26, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro., 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Economics Working Papers 8880, University of California at Berkeley.
    • Farrell, J. & Shapiro, C., 1989. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Papers e-89-3, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
    • Farrell, J. & Shapiro, C., 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," Papers 17, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
29. Joseph E Harrington Jr & Joe Chen, 2002. "Cartel Pricing Dynamics with Cost Variability and Endogenous Buyer Detection," Economics Working Paper Archive 514, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Sep 2004. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Joe Chen, 2005. "Cartel Pricing Dynamics with Cost Variability and Endogenous Buyer Detection," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-359, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
    • Harrington, Joseph Jr. & Chen, Joe, 2006. "Cartel pricing dynamics with cost variability and endogenous buyer detection," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1185-1212, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
30. Besanko, David & Spulber, Daniel F, 1989. "Antitrust Enforcement under Asymmetric Information," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(396), pages 408-25, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
31. Frank Scott, 2000. "Great School Milk Conspiracies Revisited," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 325-341, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
32. Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. Wolak, 1992. "Collusive Pricing with Capacity Constraints in the Presence of Demand Uncertainty," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 23(2), pages 203-220, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Staiger, R.W. & Wolak, F.A., 1990. "Collusive Pricing With Capacity Constraints In The Presence Of Demand Uncertainty," Papers e-90-14a, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
33. Block, Michael Kent & Nold, Frederick Carl, 1981. "The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(3), pages 429-45, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
34. Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2004. "Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000334, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2004. "Collusion with persistent cost shocks," Discussion Papers 0405-07, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2007. "Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000898, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2008. "Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 493-540, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
35. Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 1999. "Optimal Collusion with Private Information," Working papers 99-17, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
    • Athey, Susan & Bagwell, Kyle, 2001. "Optimal Collusion with Private Information," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 428-65, Autumn.
36. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1992. "Bidding Rings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 579-99, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John., 1990. "Bidding Rings," Working Papers 726, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
37. Makoto Hanazono & Huanxing Yang, 2004. "Collusion, Fluctuating Demand, and Price Rigidity," KIER Working Papers 589, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    Other versions:
    • Makoto Hanazono & Huanxing Yang, 2007. "Collusion, Fluctuating Demand, And Price Rigidity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 48(2), pages 483-515, 05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
38. Joseph E. Harrington, 2004. "Post-Cartel Pricing During Litigation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(4), pages 517-533, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Joseph E Harrington Jr, 2002. "Post-Cartel Pricing during Litigation," Economics Working Paper Archive 488, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Jun 2003. [Downloadable!]
39. Vernon A. Mund, 1960. "Identical Bid Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68, pages 150. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
40. Porter, Robert H, 1985. "On the Incidence and Duration of Price Wars," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 33(4), pages 415-26, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
41. Patrick Bajari & Lixin Ye, 2001. "Deciding Between Competition and Collusion," Working Papers 01008, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Patrick Bajari & Lixin Ye, 2003. "Deciding Between Competition and Collusion," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(4), pages 971-989, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
42. Besanko, David & Spulber, Daniel F, 1990. "Are Treble Damages Neutral? Sequential Equilibrium and Private Antitrust Enforcement," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 870-87, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
43. Osborne, Martin J & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1987. "Cartels, Profits and Excess Capacity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(2), pages 413-28, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983. "Cartels, Profits, and Excess Capacity," Working Papers 83-09, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
44. Asch, Peter & Seneca, J J, 1976. "Is Collusion Profitable?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 58(1), pages 1-12, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
45. Fabra, Natalia, 2006. "Collusion with capacity constraints over the business cycle," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 69-81, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Natalia Fabra, 2003. "Collusion with Capacity Constraints over the Business Cycle," Industrial Organization 0308001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
46. Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1989. "Collusion among asymmetric firms: The case of different discount factors," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 289-307, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
47. William S. Comanor & Mark A. Schankerman, 1976. "Identical Bids and Cartel Behavior," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 281-286, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
48. Hay, George A & Kelley, Daniel, 1974. "An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 13-38, April.
49. Chantale LaCasse, 1995. "Bid Rigging and the Threat of Government Prosecution," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(3), pages 398-417, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. A. Banerji & J.V. Meenakshi, 2008. "Millers, Commission Agents and Collusion in Grain Markets: Evidence from Basmati Auctions in North India," Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 8(1), pages 1786-1786. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Christian Lorenz, 2008. "Screening markets for cartel detection: collusive markers in the CFD cartel-audit," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 213-232, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Christian Lorenz, 2005. "Screening markets for cartel detection - collusive marker in the CFD cartel-audit," Industrial Organization 0511003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
3. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2006. "How Do Cartels Operate?," Economics Working Paper Archive 531, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
4. Ireland, Norman & Waterson, Michael, 2006. "Cartels and Search," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 770, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
5. Rieko Ishii, 2008. "Collusion in Repeated Procurement Auction: A Study of a Paving Market in Japan," ISER Discussion Paper 0710, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]