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Is Collusion Profitable?

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  • Asch, Peter
  • Seneca, J J

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  • Asch, Peter & Seneca, J J, 1976. "Is Collusion Profitable?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 58(1), pages 1-12, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:58:y:1976:i:1:p:1-12
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. O. Tejada & M. Álvarez-Mozos, 2016. "Vertical syndication-proof competitive prices in multilateral assignment markets," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(4), pages 289-327, December.
    2. Bolotova, Yuliya & Connor, John M. & Miller, Douglas J., 2008. "The impact of collusion on price behavior: Empirical results from two recent cases," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1290-1307, November.
    3. Symeonidis, George, 2018. "Collusion, profitability and welfare: Theory and evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 530-545.
    4. Symeonidis, George, 1999. "In Which Industries Is Collusion More Likely?," CEPR Discussion Papers 2301, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Dick, Andrew R, 1996. "When Are Cartels Stable Contracts?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 241-283, April.
    6. Keith Jakee & Leonie Allen, 1998. "Destructive Competition or Competition Destroyed? Regulatory Theory and the History of Irish Road Transportation Legislation," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 13-50, January.
    7. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2005. "Detecting Cartels," Economics Working Paper Archive 526, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
    8. Schmitt, Nicolas & Weder, Rolf, 1998. "Sunk costs and cartel formation: Theory and application to the dyestuff industry," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 197-220, August.
    9. Symeonidis, George, 2002. "Cartel stability with multiproduct firms," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 339-352, March.
    10. William Shughart & Fred McChesney, 2010. "Public choice theory and antitrust policy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 142(3), pages 385-406, March.
    11. William F. Shughart, 2022. "On the Virginia school of antitrust: Competition policy, law & economics and public choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 1-19, April.
    12. Ghosal, Vivek & Gallo, Joseph, 2001. "The cyclical behavior of the Department of Justice's antitrust enforcement activity," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 27-54, January.
    13. George Symeonidis, 2003. "In Which Industries is Collusion More Likely? Evidence from the UK," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(1), pages 45-74, March.
    14. Andrew R. Dick, 1989. "Are Export Cartels Efficiency-Enhancing or Monopoly-Promoting?," UCLA Economics Working Papers 601, UCLA Department of Economics.
    15. Yuliya Bolotova & John M. Connor & Douglas J. Miller, 2007. "Factors influencing the magnitude of cartel overcharges: An empirical analysis of food-industry cartels," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(1), pages 17-33.
    16. Andrew Smyth, 2017. "How Product Innovation Can Affect Price Collusion," Working Papers 17-26, Chapman University, Economic Science Institute.
    17. Thorsten Lübbers, 2009. "Is Cartelisation Profitable? A Case Study of the Rhenish Westphalian Coal Syndicate, 1893-1913," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_09, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.

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