In Which Industries is Collusion More Likely? Evidence from the UK
AbstractI examine the factors facilitating or hindering collusion using a comprehensive data set on the incidence of price-fixing across UK manufacturing industries in the 1950s. The econometric results suggest that collusion is more likely the higher the degree of capital intensity and less likely in advertising-intensive than in low-advertising industries. There is also some evidence of a non-monotonic relationship between market growth and the likelihood of collusion. There is no clear link between concentration and the incidence of collusion. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003.
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Volume (Year): 51 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
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