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In Which Industries is Collusion More Likely? Evidence from the UK

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Author Info
George Symeonidis () (University of Essex, Colchester, UK)

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Abstract

I examine the factors facilitating or hindering collusion using a comprehensive data set on the incidence of price-fixing across UK manufacturing industries in the 1950s. The econometric results suggest that collusion is more likely the higher the degree of capital intensity and less likely in advertising-intensive than in low-advertising industries. There is also some evidence of a non-monotonic relationship between market growth and the likelihood of collusion. There is no clear link between concentration and the incidence of collusion. Copyright Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003.

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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Industrial Economics.

Volume (Year): 51 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
Pages: 45-74
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:51:y:2003:i:1:p:45-74

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  1. Etienne Billette de Villemeur & Laurent Flochel & Bruno Versaevel, 2009. "Optimal Collusion with Limited Severity Constraint," Working Papers 0909, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Vives, Xavier, 2006. "Innovation and competitive pressure," IESE Research Papers D/634, IESE Business School.
    Other versions:
  3. Ganslandt, Mattias & Norbäck, Pehr-Johan, 2004. "Do Mergers Result in Collusion?," Working Paper Series 621, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-22.

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