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The Impact of Collusion on Price Behavior: Empirical Results from Two Recent Cases

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Author Info
Bolotova, Yuliya
Connor, John M.
Miller, Douglas J.

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Abstract

We used extensions of traditional ARCH and GARCH models to examine the difference in the behavior of the first two moments of the price distribution during collusion and the absence of it using prices from two recently discovered conspiracies, citric acid and lysine. According to our results, the citric acid conspiracy increased prices by 9 cents per pound relative to pre-cartel and post-cartel periods. The lysine conspiracy managed to raise prices by 25 cents per pound. In addition, the variance of prices during the lysine conspiracy was lower than the variance of prices during pre-cartel and post-cartel periods as we expected. In contrast, the variance of prices during the citric acid conspiracy was higher relative to more competitive periods.

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Paper provided by American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association) in its series 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI with number 19164.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea05:19164

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Keywords: Demand and Price Analysis;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Glenn Ellison, 1994. "Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 37-57, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. John M. Connor, 2000. "Archer Daniels Midland:Price Fixer To The World," Working Papers 00-11, Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, 2001. "Rules, Communication and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case," NBER Working Papers 8145, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Perron, Pierre, 1989. "The Great Crash, the Oil Price Shock, and the Unit Root Hypothesis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1361-1401, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Robert H. Porter, 1983. "A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 301-314, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Sproul, Michael F, 1993. "Antitrust and Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 741-54, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Engle, Robert F, 1982. "Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity with Estimates of the Variance of United Kingdom Inflation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 987-1007, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Joe Chen, 2005. "Cartel Pricing Dynamics with Cost Variability and Endogenous Buyer Detection," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-359, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2005. "Detecting Cartels," Economics Working Paper Archive 526, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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