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Collusion in Repeated Procurement Auction: a Study of Paving Market in Japan

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Author Info
Rieko Ishii () (Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University)
Abstract

We present an econometric approach to the problem of detecting bid rigging in procurement auctions using bidding data for paving works in Ibaraki City, Osaka, Japan. We first show that sporadic price wars are caused by the participation of potential goutsiders.h Assuming that the ring is all-inclusive in the absence of these outsiders, we estimate the rule by which the ring selects the winner. It is found that the ring tends to select a bidder whose time elapsed from the last winning is long and whose winning amount in the past is small relative to other bidders.

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Paper provided by Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) in its series Discussion Papers in Economics and Business with number 07-16.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: May 2007
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Handle: RePEc:osk:wpaper:0716

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Web page: http://www.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/
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Related research
Keywords: Bid rigging repeated auction.

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations

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  1. Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, 1999. "Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 263-288, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2003. "Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 79-105, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Pesendorfer, Martin, 2000. "A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 67(3), pages 381-411, July.
  4. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1992. "Bidding Rings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 579-99, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    • McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John., 1990. "Bidding Rings," Working Papers 726, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  5. Patrick Bajari & Lixin Ye, 2003. "Deciding Between Competition and Collusion," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(4), pages 971-989, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Hopenhayn, Hugo, 2004. "Tacit collusion in repeated auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 153-169, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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