Collusion detection in procurement auctions
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- A. Banerji & J.V. Meenakshi, 2004.
"Buyer Collusion and Efficiency of Government Intervention in Wheat Markets in Northern India: An Asymmetric Structural Auctions Analysis,"
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 86(1), pages 236-253.
- A. Banerji and J.V.Meenakshi & J.V.Meenakshi, 2002. "Buyer Collusion and Efficiency of Government Intervention in Wheat Markets in Northern India: An Asymmetric Structural Auctions Analysis," Working papers 104, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Patrick Bajari, 2001. "Comparing competition and collusion: a numerical approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 18(1), pages 187-205.
- Brannman, Lance & Klein, J Douglass & Weiss, Leonard W, 1987. "The Price Effects of Increased Competition in Auction Markets," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 69(1), pages 24-32, February.
- Feinstein, Jonathan S & Block, Michael K & Nold, Frederick C, 1985. "Asymmetric Information and Collusive Behavior in Auction Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 441-460, June.
- Patrick Bajari & Lixin Ye, 2003.
"Deciding Between Competition and Collusion,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(4), pages 971-989, November.
- Patrick Bajari & Lixin Ye, 2001. "Deciding Between Competition and Collusion," Working Papers 01008, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- William S. Comanor & Mark A. Schankerman, 1976. "Identical Bids and Cartel Behavior," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 281-286, Spring.
- Porter, Robert H & Zona, J Douglas, 1993.
"Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 518-538, June.
- Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, 1992. "Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions," NBER Working Papers 4013, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- In Lee & Kyungdong Hahn, 2002. "Bid-Rigging in Auctions for Korean Public-Works Contracts and Potential Damage," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 21(1), pages 73-88, August.
- Baldwin, Laura H & Marshall, Robert C & Richard, Jean-Francois, 1997.
"Bidder Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 657-699, August.
- Marshall, R.C. & Richard J.F., 1995. "Bider Collusion at Forest Service Timber Sales," Papers 7-95-3, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
- Srabana Gupta, 2001. "The Effect of Bid Rigging on Prices: A Study of the Highway Construction Industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 19(4), pages 451-465, December.
- Anna Zarkada-Fraser & Martin Skitmore, 2000. "Decisions with moral content: collusion," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(1), pages 101-111.
- Paulo K. Monteiro & Flavio M. Menezes, 2000. "original papers : Auctions with endogenous participation," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 5(1), pages 71-89.
- Holt, Charles A, Jr, 1979. "Uncertainty and the Bidding for Incentive Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(4), pages 697-705, September.
- Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H, 1988. "An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 865-883, December.
- McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1992.
"Bidding Rings,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 579-599, June.
- McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John., 1990. "Bidding Rings," Working Papers 726, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, 1999.
"Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 263-288, Summer.
- Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, 1997. "Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding," NBER Working Papers 6037, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ishii, Rieko, 2009. "Favor exchange in collusion: Empirical study of repeated procurement auctions in Japan," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 137-144, March.
- Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1981. "Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1477-1499, November.
- Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Hopenhayn, Hugo, 2004.
"Tacit collusion in repeated auctions,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 153-169, January.
- Hopenhayn, Hugo A. & Skrzypacz, Andrzej, 2001. "Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions," Research Papers 1698r2, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Jofre-Bonet, Mireia & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2000. "Bidding behavior in a repeated procurement auction: A summary," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 1006-1020, May.
- Reinhard Selten, 1973. "A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition, where 4 are Few and 6 are Many," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 008, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Berardino Cesi & Adriano Di Natale, 2019. "Transparency in repeated procurement: when hiding is better," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 39(1), pages 14-23.
- In Lee & Kyungdong Hahn, 2002. "Bid-Rigging in Auctions for Korean Public-Works Contracts and Potential Damage," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 21(1), pages 73-88, August.
- Andrey Yakovlev & Aleksandra Bashina & Olga Demidova, 2014. "The effectiveness of simple homogeneous commodity procurement under rigid govermental regulation: the case of granulated sugar procurement in Russia," HSE Working papers WP BRP 13/PA/2014, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Patrick Bajari & Garrett Summers, "undated". "Detecting Collusion in Procurement Auctions: A Selective Survey of Recent Research," Working Papers 01014, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
- Sherstyuk, Katerina, 2002.
"Collusion in private value ascending price auctions,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 177-195, June.
- Sherstyuk, K., 1999. "Collusion in Private Value Ascending Price Auctions," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 707, The University of Melbourne.
- Sherstyuk Katerina, 1999. "Collision in Private Value Ascending Price Auctions," Working Papers 1063, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- David Barrus & Frank Scott, 2020. "Single Bidders and Tacit Collusion in Highway Procurement Auctions," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(3), pages 483-522, September.
- Wang, Hong, 2017. "Information acquisition versus information manipulation in multi-period procurement markets," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 48-59.
- Huber, Martin & Imhof, David, 2023. "Flagging cartel participants with deep learning based on convolutional neural networks," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
- Imhof, David, 2017. "Simple Statistical Screens to Detect Bid Rigging," FSES Working Papers 484, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Freiburg/Fribourg Switzerland.
- Imhof, David, 2017. "Econometric tests to detect bid-rigging cartels: does it work?," FSES Working Papers 483, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Freiburg/Fribourg Switzerland.
- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2005. "Detecting Cartels," Economics Working Paper Archive 526, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- Martin Huber & David Imhof & Rieko Ishii, 2022.
"Transnational machine learning with screens for flagging bid‐rigging cartels,"
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 185(3), pages 1074-1114, July.
- Huber, Martin & Imhof, David, 2020. "Transnational machine learning with screens for flagging bid-rigging cartels," FSES Working Papers 519, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Freiburg/Fribourg Switzerland.
- Huber, Martin & Imhof, David, 2019.
"Machine learning with screens for detecting bid-rigging cartels,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 277-301.
- Huber, Martin & Imhof, David, 2018. "Machine Learning with Screens for Detecting Bid-Rigging Cartels," FSES Working Papers 494, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Freiburg/Fribourg Switzerland.
- Granlund, David & Rudholm, Niklas, 2023. "Calculating the probability of collusion based on observed price patterns," Umeå Economic Studies 1014, Umeå University, Department of Economics, revised 13 Oct 2023.
- Gabrielli, M. Florencia & Willington, Manuel, 2023. "Estimating damages from bidding rings in first-price auctions," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
- Mats A. Bergman & Johan Lundberg & Sofia Lundberg & Johan Y. Stake, 2020. "Interactions Across Firms and Bid Rigging," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 56(1), pages 107-130, February.
- Aryal, Gaurab & Gabrielli, Maria F., 2013.
"Testing for collusion in asymmetric first-price auctions,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 26-35.
- Gaurab Aryal & Maria F. Gabrielli, 2011. "Testing for Collusion in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2011-564, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
- Blume, Andreas & Heidhues, Paul, 2006.
"Private monitoring in auctions,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 179-211, November.
- Andreas Blume & Paul Heidhues, 2003. "Private Monitoring in Auctions," CIG Working Papers SP II 2003-14, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
- Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, 2006.
"Empirical Models of Auctions,"
NBER Working Papers
12126, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, 2006. "Empirical Models of Auctions," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001045, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, 2006. "Empirical Models of Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1562, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Meenakshi, J.V. & Banerji, A., 2005. "The unsupportable support price: an analysis of collusion and government intervention in paddy auction markets in North India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 377-403, April.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont, 1998. "Théorie des jeux et économie empirique : le cas des données issues d'enchères," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 132(1), pages 121-137.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997.
"Game theory and empirical economics: The case of auction data 1,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 1-35, January.
- Laffont, J.J., 1996. "Game Theory and Empirical Economics: The Case of Auction Data," Papers 95.394, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Tostao, Emilio & Chung, Chanjin & Brorsen, B. Wade, 2006. "Integrating the Structural Auction Approach and Traditional Measures of Market Power," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21244, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
More about this item
Keywords
Bid-rigging; Tacit collusion; Public procurement; Cartel; Open auction.;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L92 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2013-12-06 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2013-12-06 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-TRA-2013-12-06 (Transition Economics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hig:wpaper:25/ec/2013. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Shamil Abdulaev or Shamil Abdulaev (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/hsecoru.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.