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Buyer Collusion and Efficiency of Government Intervention in Wheat Markets in Northern India: An Asymmetric Structural Auctions Analysis

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  • A. Banerji
  • J.V. Meenakshi

Abstract

This article uses auction theory to analyze wholesale markets for wheat in Northern India. This approach enables us to characterize the market in terms of buyer asymmetries, to detect the existence of collusion, and to quantify its impact on market prices. We show that buyer asymmetries exacerbate the downward impact of collusion on prices. The article also considers whether the government paid too much for the wheat it procured at the minimum support price, and shows that for our sample it did not. The article is based on a primary survey of two wholesale markets in North India. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00575.x
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Agricultural and Applied Economics Association in its journal American Journal of Agricultural Economics.

Volume (Year): 86 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 236-253

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Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:86:y:2004:i:1:p:236-253

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Cited by:
  1. Tostao, Emilio & Chung, Chanjin & Brorsen, B. Wade, 2006. "Integrating the Structural Auction Approach and Traditional Measures of Market Power," 2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA 21244, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
  2. Bart Minten & Anneleen Vandeplas & Johan F.M.Swinnen, 2011. "Regulations, brokers, and interlinkages: The institutional organization of wholesale markets in India," LICOS Discussion Papers 28811, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
  3. Dasgupta, Dipak & Dubey, R.N. & Sathish, R, 2011. "Domestic Wheat Price Formation and Food Inflation in India," MPRA Paper 31564, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Dipak Dasgupta & R N Dubey & R Satish, 2011. "Domestic Wheat Price Formation and Food Inflation in India: International Prices, Domestic Drivers (Stocks, Weather, Public Policy), and the Efficacy of Public Policy Interventions in Wheat Markets," Working Papers id:4291, eSocialSciences.
  5. Reardon, Thomas & Minten, Bart, 2011. "The quiet revolution in India's food supply chains:," IFPRI discussion papers 1115, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
  6. Minten, Bart & Reardon, Thomas & Vandeplas, Anneleen, 2009. "Linking urban consumers and rural farmers in India: A comparison of traditional and modern food supply chains," IFPRI discussion papers 883, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
  7. Meenakshi, J.V. & Banerji, A., 2005. "The unsupportable support price: an analysis of collusion and government intervention in paddy auction markets in North India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 377-403, April.
  8. Ilya Morozov & Elena Podkolzina, 2013. "Collusion detection in procurement auctions," HSE Working papers WP BRP 25/EC/2013, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
  9. Dawe, David C. & Moya, Piedad F. & Casiwan, Cheryll B. & Cabling, Jesusa M., 2008. "Rice marketing systems in the Philippines and Thailand: Do large numbers of competitive traders ensure good performance?," Food Policy, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 455-463, October.
  10. Minten, Bart & Vandeplas, Anneleen & Swinnen, Johan F.M., 2011. "The broken broker system?: Transacting on agricultural wholesale markets in India (Uttarakhand)," IFPRI discussion papers 1143, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).

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