Calculating the probability of collusion based on observed price patterns
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More about this item
Keywords
bid rigging; price coordination; cartels; collusion screening; competition;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C57 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Econometrics of Games and Auctions
- D22 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Empirical Analysis
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2023-06-19 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2023-06-19 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-REG-2023-06-19 (Regulation)
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