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Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Aoyagi, Masaki
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory .
Volume (Year): 112 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
Pages: 79-105
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:112:y:2003:i:1:p:79-105Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
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Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)Eduardo Monteiro & Humberto Moreira, 2006.
"Effciency In Two Player Repeated Games Of Imperfect Monitoring ,"
Anais do XXXIV Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 34th Brazilian Economics Meeting]
113, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics].
[Downloadable!]
Crémer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad, 1991.
"Gathering Information before Signing a Contract ,"
IDEI Working Papers
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Other versions:
Cremer, J. & Khalil, F., 1991.
"Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract ,"
Working Papers
91-16, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
Cremer, J. & Khalil, F., 1991.
"Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract ,"
Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington
91-16, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
Cremer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad, 1992.
"Gathering Information before Signing a Contract ,"
American Economic Review ,
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[Downloadable!] (restricted) Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Kim-Sau Chung, 2002.
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Hayley Chouinard & Jonathan Yoder, 2006.
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Other versions: repec:att:wimass:192044 is not listed on IDEAS
Tan, Guofu & Yilankaya, Okan, 2004.
"Ratifiability of Efficient Collusive Mechanisms in Second-Price Auctions with Participation Costs ,"
Micro Theory Working Papers
tan-04-04-30-01-35-41, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 09 Jun 2006.
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Other versions:
Guofu Tan & Okan Yilankaya, 2005.
"Ratifiability of Efficient Collusive Mechanisms in Second-Price Auctions with Participation Costs ,"
IEPR Working Papers
05.15, Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR).
[Downloadable!] Tan, Guofu & Yilankaya, Okan, 2007.
"Ratifiability of efficient collusive mechanisms in second-price auctions with participation costs ,"
Games and Economic Behavior ,
Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 383-396, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Kim-Sau Chung, 2002.
"Optimal Repeated Auction with Tacit Collusion (joint with Atila Abdulkadiroglu) ,"
Theory workshop papers
357966000000000093, UCLA Department of Economics.
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Nicolas Gruyer, 2005.
"Using lotteries in auctions when buyers collude ,"
Economics Working Papers
02, LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school).
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Brett Bryan & Jeffery Connor et al, 2005., 2005.
"Catchment Care - Developing an Auction Process for Biodiversity and Water Quality Gains. Volume 1 - Report ,"
Natural Resource Management Economics
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Atila Abdulkadiroglu & Kyle Bagwell, 2005.
"Trust, reciprocity and favors in cooperative relationships ,"
Discussion Papers
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Andreas Blume & Paul Heidhues, 2003.
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CIG Working Papers
SP II 2003-14, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
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Other versions: Hayley Chouinard, 2006.
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Yoshiaki Ogura, 2006.
"Endogenous Relationship Banking to Alleviate Excessive Screening Transaction Banking ,"
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Rieko Ishii, 2007.
"Collusion in Repeated Procurement Auction: a Study of Paving Market in Japan ,"
Discussion Papers in Economics and Business
07-16, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
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Alberto Martin & Wouter Vergote, 2005.
"On the Role of Retaliation in Trade Agreements ,"
Economics Working Papers
914, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Apr 2008.
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MARTIN, Alberto & VERGOTE, Wouter, 2007.
"On the role of retaliation in trade agreements ,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2007089, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
[Downloadable!] Martin, Alberto & Vergote, Wouter, 2008.
"On the role of retaliation in trade agreements ,"
Journal of International Economics ,
Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 61-77, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Rieko Ishii, 2008.
"Collusion in Repeated Procurement Auction: A Study of a Paving Market in Japan ,"
ISER Discussion Paper
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Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2007.
"Collusion with Persistent Cost Shocks ,"
Levine's Bibliography
321307000000000898, UCLA Department of Economics.
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"Collusion with persistent cost shocks ,"
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[Downloadable!] Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2004.
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Levine's Bibliography
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[Downloadable!] Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2008.
"Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 493-540, 05.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Nicolas Gruyer, 2008.
"Optimal Auctions when a seller is bound to sell to collusive bidders (new version of "using lotteries ...") ,"
Economics Working Papers
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Martin, Alberto & Vergote, Wouter, 2004.
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