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Collusion in Industrial Economics—A Survey

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  • Switgard Feuerstein

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to summarize the theory of (implicit) collusion in the framework of infinitely repeated games, and in particular, to survey the comprehensive literature exploring which factors make collusion easier or more difficult to sustain. On this basis, the existing empirical studies and the experimental results will be discussed. Policy options as e.g. leniency programs are also analyzed. Although the number of clear cut policy conclusions is limited, understanding thoroughly the mechanisms of collusion is important for (anti-trust) policies. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade.

Volume (Year): 5 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Pages: 163-198

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Handle: RePEc:kap:jincot:v:5:y:2005:i:3:p:163-198

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Web page: http://springerlink.metapress.com/link.asp?id=105724

Related research

Keywords: collusion; capacity constraints; international oligopolies; competition policy; leniency programs;

References

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Cited by:
  1. Pio Baake & Vanessa von Schlippenbach, 2010. "Quality Distortions in Vertical Relations," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 968, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
  2. Chris Kuo, 2013. "Billing Abuses by the Experts: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Legal Services," Journal of Economics and Management, College of Business, Feng Chia University, Taiwan, vol. 9(1), pages 13-30, January.
  3. Selvaggi, Marianao & Vasconcelos, Luis, 2006. "Star Wars: Exclusive Superstars and Collusive Outcomes," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp496, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia.
  4. Budzinski, Oliver & Christiansen, Arndt, 2007. "The Oracle/PeopleSoft case: unilateral effects, simulation models and econometrics in contemporary merger control," IBES Diskussionsbeiträge 157, University of Duisburg-Essen, Faculty for Economics and Business Administration.
  5. repec:hal:wpaper:hal-00709093 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Luís Cabral, 2005. "Collusion Theory: Where to Go Next?," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 199-206, December.
  7. Klaus Friesenbichler & George Clarke & Michael Wong, 2014. "Price competition and market transparency: evidence from a random response technique," Empirica, Springer, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 5-21, February.
  8. Doruk İriş & Luís Santos-Pinto, 2013. "Tacit Collusion under Fairness and Reciprocity," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 4(1), pages 50-65, February.
  9. Christoph Engel, 2009. "Competition as a Socially Desirable Dilemma. Theory vs. Experimental Evidence," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_24, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
  10. Hwa Ryung Lee, 2010. "Multimarket contact effect on collusion through diversification," IEW - Working Papers 501, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  11. Aldo Montesano, 2012. "Price collusion with free entry: the parasitic competition," International Review of Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 41-65, March.
  12. Andersson, Ola, 2008. "On the role of patience in collusive Bertrand duopolies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 60-63, July.
  13. Zhang, Yahua & Round, David K., 2011. "Price wars and price collusion in China's airline markets," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 361-372, July.
  14. António Brandão & Joana Pinho & Hélder Vasconcelos, 2013. "Asymmetric collusion with growing demand," FEP Working Papers 510, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
  15. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nicolas Drouhin, 2012. "Tacit collusion in a one-shot game of price competition with soft capacity constraints," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00709093, HAL.
  16. Savorelli, Luca, 2012. "Asymmetric cross-price effects and collusion," Research in Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 66(4), pages 375-382.
  17. Richard Schmalensee, 2012. "“On a Level with Dentists?” Reflections on the Evolution of Industrial Organization," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 157-179, November.
  18. Pedro Mendi & Rafael Moner-Colonques & José Sempere-Monerris, 2011. "Vertical integration, collusion, and tariffs," SERIEs, Spanish Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 359-378, September.
  19. Andersson, Ola, 2006. "Bargaining in Collusive Markets," Working Papers 2006:21, Lund University, Department of Economics.

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