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Dominance and monopolization

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Listed:
  • Canoy, M.F.M.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • van Damme, E.E.C.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Rey, P.

Abstract

This indispensable Handbook examines both economic and legal aspects of competition policy and industrial organization. It provides a scholarly review of the state of the art regarding economic theory, empirical evidence and standards of legal evaluation. The book aims primarily at furthering our understanding of the interplay between economic reasoning and legal expertise by concentrating on the fundamental issues and principles underlying competition policy.
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Suggested Citation

  • Canoy, M.F.M. & van Damme, E.E.C. & Rey, P., 2004. "Dominance and monopolization," Other publications TiSEM e2bd13c5-fe22-4200-8dd1-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:e2bd13c5-fe22-4200-8dd1-aa978f82ec61
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