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On the Strategic Importance of Prices versus Quantities

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Author Info
James W. Friedman

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Abstract

In this article I investigate three single-shot models of differentiated-products oligopoly. In each model firms choose both output and price. The demand, cost, and spillover demand specifications are quite general, and there are three main results. First, with simultaneous choice there is no pure-strategy noncooperative equilibrium. Second, with output chosen first and announced to all firms before the choice of price, equilibrium sometimes exists, and when it does, it is the same as in a quantity-only model. Third, with price chosen and announced first, equilibrium always exists and is the same as in a price-only model.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 19 (1988)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
Pages: 607-622
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Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:19:y:1988:i:winter:p:607-622

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  1. Neary, J Peter & Tharakan, Joe, 2006. "Endogenous Mode of Competition in General Equilibrium," CEPR Discussion Papers 5943, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Marcel Canoy, 1994. "Natural monopoly and differential pricing," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 59(3), pages 287-309, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Switgard Feuerstein, 2005. "Collusion in Industrial Economics—A Survey," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 163-198, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Nicolas Boccard & Xavier Wauthy, 2005. "Equilibrium payoffs in a Bertrand-Edgeworth model with product differentiation," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 12(11), pages 1-8. [Downloadable!]
  5. Makoto Yano, 2006. "A price competition game under free entry," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 395-414, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Jordi Brandts & Pablo Guill?, 2004. "Collusion and Fights in an Experiment with Price-Setting Firms and Production in Advance," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 618.04, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
  7. Luca Lambertini, 1996. "Strategic Delegation and the Shape of Market Competition," Working Papers 267, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2004. "Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibrium with a large number of firms," Indian Statistical Institute, Planning Unit, New Delhi Discussion Papers 04-12, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Ivaldi, Marc & Jullien, Bruno & Rey, Patrick & Seabright, Paul & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "The Economics of Unilateral Effects," IDEI Working Papers 222, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  10. Antón García Díaz & Praveen Kujal, 2003. "List Pricing And Pure Strategy Outcomes In A Bertrand-Edgeworth Duopoly," Economics Working Papers we034918, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
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