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Government-Assisted Oligopoly Coordination? A Concrete Case

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Author Info
Albaek, Svend
Mollgaard, Peter
Overgaard, Per B

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Abstract

In 1993, the Danish antitrust authority decided to gather and publish firm-specific transactions prices for two grades of ready-mixed concrete in three regions of Denmark. Following initial publication, average prices of reported grades increased by 15-20 percent within one year. The authors investigate whether this was due to a business upturn and/or capacity constraints, but argue that these seem to have little explanatory power. They conclude that a better explanation is that publication of prices allowed firms to reduce the intensity of oligopoly price competition and, hence, led to increased prices contrary to the aim of the authority. Copyright 1997 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd

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Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Industrial Economics.

Volume (Year): 45 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 429-43
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Handle: RePEc:bla:jindec:v:45:y:1997:i:4:p:429-43

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  1. Møllgaard, Peter, 2002. "Must Trust Bust?," Working Papers 02-2002, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Ireland, Norman & Waterson, Michael, 2006. "Cartels and Search," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 770, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Liliane Karlinger, 2008. "How Demand Information Can Destabilize a Cartel," Vienna Economics Papers 0803, University of Vienna, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Per Baltzer Overgaard & H. Peter Møllgaard, 2007. "Information Exchange, Market Transparency and Dynamic Oligopoly," Economics Working Papers 2007-03, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Boone, J. & Potters, J., 2002. "Transparency, prices, and welfare with imperfect substitutes," Discussion Paper 7, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Steffen Huck & Hans-Theo Normann & Joerg Oechssler, 1998. "Does information about competitors' actions increase or decrease competition in experimental oligopoly markets?," Industrial Organization 9803004, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Jakub Kastl & Salvatore Piccolo, 2004. "Collusive Effects of Vertical Restraints under Asymmetric Information," CSEF Working Papers 113, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  8. Christian Growitsch & Thomas Wein, 2005. "Negotiated Third Party Access—An Industrial Organisation Perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 165-183, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Morten Hviid & H. Peter Møllgaard, 2000. "Countervailing Power and Price Transparency," CIE Discussion Papers 2000-01, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  10. H. Peter Møllgaard & Per Baltzer Overgaard, 1999. "Market Transparency: A Mixed Blessing?," CIE Discussion Papers 1999-15, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics, revised Feb 2000. [Downloadable!]
  11. Cotterill, Ronald W. & Dhar, Tirtha, 2003. "Oligopoly Pricing with Differentiated Products: The Boston Fluid Milk Market Channel," Research Reports 25189, University of Connecticut, Food Marketing Policy Center. [Downloadable!]
  12. Waterson, Michael, 2001. "The role of consumers in competition and competition policy," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 607, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Lommerud, Kjell Erik & Sørgard, Lars, 2002. "Entry in Telecommunication: Customer Loyalty, Price Sensitivity and Access Prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 3502, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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