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Duopoly Behavior in Asymmetric Markets: An Experimental Evaluation

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Author Info
Mason, Charles F
Phillips, Owen R
Nowell, Clifford
Abstract

Experimental duopolies are analyzed to answer two questions: Are asymmetric duopolies less likely to collude than symmetric duopolies? Is the time it takes to reach an equilibrium affected by asymmetry? In a repeated game where output is the choice , the authors have data for nineteen (respectively, twenty-one) subject pairs where both agents are low-cost (respectively, high-cost) and twenty-five subject pairs where one agent is high-cost and one is low-cost. Subjects make choices for at least thirty-five periods. Results indicate that asymmetric markets are less cooperative and take longer to reach equilibrium than symmetric markets. Copyright 1992 by MIT Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Review of Economics & Statistics.

Volume (Year): 74 (1992)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Pages: 662-70
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Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:74:y:1992:i:4:p:662-70

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  1. Datta, Shakun & Offenberg, Jennifer, 2003. "An Experimental Examination of Competitor-Based Price Matching Guarantees," MPRA Paper 575, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Oct 2006. [Downloadable!]
  2. Claudia Keser, 2000. "Strategically Planned Behavior in Public Good Experiments," CIRANO Working Papers 2000s-35, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  3. David Goodwin & Stuart Mestelman, 2003. "Advance Production Duopolies and Posted Prices or Market-Clearing Prices," McMaster Experimental Economics Laboratory Publications 2003-04, McMaster University. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Anthony Ziegelmeyer & Katinka Pantz, 2005. "Collaborative Networks in Experimental Triopolies," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2005-38, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  5. Shakun Datta Mago & Emmanuel Dechenaux, 2009. "Price leadership and firm size asymmetry: an experimental analysis," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 289-317, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Switgard Feuerstein, 2005. "Collusion in Industrial Economics—A Survey," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 163-198, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Charles F. Mason, 2006. "Experimental Duopoly in the Classroom," Journal of Industrial Organization Education, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 1(1). [Downloadable!]
  8. Ivaldi, Marc & Jullien, Bruno & Rey, Patrick & Seabright, Paul & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "The Economics of Tacit Collusion," IDEI Working Papers 186, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  9. Steffen Huck & Hans-Theo Normann & Jörg Oechssler, 2001. "Two are Few and Four are Many: Number Effects in Experimental Oligopolies," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse12_2001, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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