We examine auction data to determine if bid rigging presents in procurement auctions for paving works in Ibaraki City, Osaka, Japan. We first show that sporadic bidding wars are caused by the participation of potential "outsiders." Assuming that the ring is all-inclusive if the auction is not the bidding war, we estimate the scheme by which the ring allocates a win to its members. It is found that the ring tends to select a bidder whose winless period is long and whose winning amount in the past is small relative to other bidders.
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Paper provided by Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University in its series ISER Discussion Paper with number
0710.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Fumiko Matsumoto).
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McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1992.
"Bidding Rings,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 579-99, June.
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Other versions:
McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John., 1990.
"Bidding Rings,"
Working Papers
726, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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