Collusion in Repeated Procurement Auction: A Study of a Paving Market in Japan
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- Rieko Ishii, 2007. "Collusion in Repeated Procurement Auction: a Study of Paving Market in Japan," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 07-16, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
References listed on IDEAS
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- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2005. "Detecting Cartels," Economics Working Paper Archive 526, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Arai, Koki & Ishibashi, Ikuo & Ishii-Ishibashi, Rieko, 2011. "Research and analysis on bid rigging mechanisms," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 1-5, January.
- Ishii, Rieko, 2009. "Favor exchange in collusion: Empirical study of repeated procurement auctions in Japan," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 137-144, March.
- Rieko Ishii, 2014. "Bid Roundness Under Collusion in Japanese Procurement Auctions," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 44(3), pages 241-254, May.
- Maris Goldmanis & Antonio Penta & Francesco Decarolis, 2012.
"Common Agency and Coordinated Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions,"
2012 Meeting Papers
106, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Francesco Decarolis & Maris Goldmanis & Antonio Penta, 2013. "Common Agency and Coordinated Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions," Working Papers 13-19, NET Institute.
- Imhof, David, 2017. "Simple Statistical Screens to Detect Bid Rigging," FSES Working Papers 484, Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Freiburg/Fribourg Switzerland.
- Francesco Decarolis, 2009.
"When the highest bidder loses the auction: theory and evidence from public procurement,"
Temi di discussione (Economic working papers)
717, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Francesco Decarolis, 2009. "When the Highest Bidder Loses the Auction: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement," 2009 Meeting Papers 130, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Sylvain Chassang & Juan Ortner, 2017. "Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement," Working Papers 072_2015, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
More about this item
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
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