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Collusion in Repeated Procurement Auction: a Study of Paving Market in Japan

  • Rieko Ishii

    ()

    (Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University)

We present an econometric approach to the problem of detecting bid rigging in procurement auctions using bidding data for paving works in Ibaraki City, Osaka, Japan. We first show that sporadic price wars are caused by the participation of potential goutsiders.h Assuming that the ring is all-inclusive in the absence of these outsiders, we estimate the rule by which the ring selects the winner. It is found that the ring tends to select a bidder whose time elapsed from the last winning is long and whose winning amount in the past is small relative to other bidders.

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File URL: http://www2.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/global/dp/0716.pdf
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Paper provided by Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP) in its series Discussion Papers in Economics and Business with number 07-16.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: May 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:osk:wpaper:0716
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.osaka-u.ac.jp/Email:


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  1. Patrick Bajari & Lixin Ye, 2003. "Deciding Between Competition and Collusion," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(4), pages 971-989, November.
  2. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1992. "Bidding Rings," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 579-99, June.
    • McAfee, R. Preston & McMillan, John., 1990. "Bidding Rings," Working Papers 726, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  3. Aoyagi, Masaki, 2003. "Bid rotation and collusion in repeated auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 79-105, September.
  4. Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, 1992. "Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions," NBER Working Papers 4013, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Skrzypacz, Andrzej & Hopenhayn, Hugo, 2004. "Tacit collusion in repeated auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 153-169, January.
  6. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2005. "Detecting Cartels," Economics Working Paper Archive 526, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
  7. Robert H. Porter & J. Douglas Zona, 1999. "Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(2), pages 263-288, Summer.
  8. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521016919 is not listed on IDEAS
  9. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521816632 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Pesendorfer, Martin, 2000. "A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 381-411, July.
  11. Robert Porter, 2005. "Detecting Collusion," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 147-167, December.
  12. John McMillan, 1991. "Dango: Japan'S Price-Fixing Conspiracies," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(3), pages 201-218, November.
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