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Identical Bid Prices

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  • Vernon A. Mund

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Suggested Citation

  • Vernon A. Mund, 1960. "Identical Bid Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(2), pages 150-150.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:68:y:1960:p:150
    DOI: 10.1086/258292
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    Cited by:

    1. Nicolas Gruyer, 2009. "Optimal Auctions When A Seller Is Bound To Sell To Collusive Bidders," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 57(4), pages 835-850, December.
    2. Nicolas Gruyer, 2005. "Using lotteries in auctions when buyers collude," Working Papers hal-01021534, HAL.
    3. Nicolas Gruyer, 2005. "Using lotteries in auctions when buyers collude," Economics Working Papers 02, LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school).
    4. John Connor, 2005. "Collusion and price dispersion," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(6), pages 335-338.
    5. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2005. "Detecting Cartels," Economics Working Paper Archive 526, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
    6. Stephan Lauermann & Asher Wolinsky, 2017. "Bidder Solicitation, Adverse Selection, and the Failure of Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(6), pages 1399-1429, June.
    7. Patrick Bajari & Garrett Summers, "undated". "Detecting Collusion in Procurement Auctions: A Selective Survey of Recent Research," Working Papers 01014, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
    8. Kenneth Hendricks & Robert H. Porter, 1989. "Collusion in Auctions," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 15-16, pages 217-230.
    9. Nicolas Gruyer, 2008. "Optimal Auctions when a seller is bound to sell to collusive bidders (new version of "using lotteries ...")," Economics Working Papers 06, LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school).

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