This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Cartels, Profits and Excess Capacity

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Osborne, Martin J
Pitchik, Carolyn

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

A model of a collusive duopoly in which each firm has limited capacity is studied. The negotiated output quotas depend on the bargaining power of the firms, which derives from the damage the firms can do by cutting prices. For fixed capacities, the unit profit of the small firm is at least as large as that of the large firm, and the relative position of the small firm is better when demand is low. When the capacities can be chosen once-and-for-all, there is excess capacity in equilibrium so long as the cost of capacity is not too high. Copyright 1987 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-6598%28198706%2928%3A2%3C413%3ACPAEC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H&origin=repec
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 28 (1987)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 413-28
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:28:y:1987:i:2:p:413-28

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 160 McNeil Building, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297
Phone: (215) 898-8487
Fax: (215) 573-2057
Email:
Web page: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/ier
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=0020-6598

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
  1. Carl Davidson & Raymond Deneckere, 1984. "Excess Capacity and Collusion," Discussion Papers 675, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Davidson, Carl & Deneckere, Raymond J, 1990. "Excess Capacity and Collusion," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(3), pages 521-41, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Tay-Cheng Ma, 2005. "Strategic investment and excess capacity: A study of the Taiwanese flour industry," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 153-170, May. [Downloadable!]
  3. Christian Lorenz, 2008. "Screening markets for cartel detection: collusive markers in the CFD cartel-audit," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 213-232, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Thierry Penard, 1997. "Choix de capacités et comportements stratégiques," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 46, pages 09, Avril-Jui. [Downloadable!]
  5. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2005. "Detecting Cartels," Economics Working Paper Archive 526, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can create a compilation of all publications of a group of people, say alumni of a program, your students or memers of an association.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-21.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.