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Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law & Economics.

Volume (Year): 17 (1974)
Issue (Month): 1 (April)
Pages: 13-38
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:v:17:y:1974:i:1:p:13-38

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