Screening markets for cartel detection - collusive marker in the CFD cartel-audit
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 13
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Christian Lorenz, 2008. "Screening markets for cartel detection: collusive markers in the CFD cartel-audit," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 213-232, October.
References listed on IDEAS
- Osborne, Martin J & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1987.
"Cartels, Profits and Excess Capacity,"
International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(2), pages 413-428, June.
- Osborne, Martin J. & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1983. "Cartels, Profits, and Excess Capacity," Working Papers 83-09, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- repec:bla:jindec:v:45:y:1997:i:4:p:429-43 is not listed on IDEAS
- Harrington, Joseph Jr. & Chen, Joe, 2006.
"Cartel pricing dynamics with cost variability and endogenous buyer detection,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1185-1212, November.
- Joseph E Harrington Jr & Joe Chen, 2002. "Cartel Pricing Dynamics with Cost Variability and Endogenous Buyer Detection," Economics Working Paper Archive 514, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Sep 2004.
- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. & Joe Chen, 2005. "Cartel Pricing Dynamics with Cost Variability and Endogenous Buyer Detection," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-359, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M. & Froeb, Luke M. & Geweke, John & Taylor, Christopher T., 2006. "A variance screen for collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 467-486, May.
- Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2002. "What Determines Cartel Success?," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2002-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
- Johan Stennek, 1997. "Coordination in Oligopoly," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 99(4), pages 541-554, December.
- Asch, Peter & Seneca, Joseph J, 1975. "Characteristics of Collusive Firms," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(3), pages 223-237, March.
- Svend Albæk & Peter Møllgaard & Per B. Overgaard, 1997.
"Government‐Assisted Oligopoly Coordination? A Concrete Case,"
Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(4), pages 429-443, December.
- Svend Albæk & Peter Møllgaard & Per Baltzer Overgaard, 1997. "Government-Assisted Oligopoly Coordination? A Concrete Case," CIE Discussion Papers 1997-03, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Industrial Economics.
- Robert Porter, 2005. "Detecting Collusion," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 26(2), pages 147-167, December.
- Ivaldi, Marc & Jullien, Bruno & Rey, Patrick & Seabright, Paul & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "The Economics of Tacit Collusion," IDEI Working Papers 186, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2005. "Detecting Cartels," Economics Working Paper Archive 526, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
- Veltins, Michael A. & Schaller, Armin & Blum, Ulrich, 2004. "The East German Cement Cartel : An Inquiry into Comparable Markets, Industry Structure, and Antitrust Policy," Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics 04/04, Technische Universität Dresden, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of Economics.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Kai Hüschelrath & Tobias Veith, 2014.
"Cartel Detection in Procurement Markets,"
Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 35(6), pages 404-422, September.
- Hüschelrath, Kai & Veith, Tobias, 2011. "Cartel detection in procurement markets," ZEW Discussion Papers 11-066, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Korbinian Blanckenburg & Alexander Geist, 2009. "How Can a Cartel Be Detected?," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 15(4), pages 421-436, November.
- Hans W. Friederiszick & Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, 2008. "Triggering Inspections Ex Officio: Moving Beyond A Passive Eu Cartel Policy," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 89-113.
- repec:kap:iaecre:v:15:y:2009:i:4:p:421-436 is not listed on IDEAS
- Garcia Pires, Armando J. & Skjeret, Frode, 2023. "Screening for partial collusion in retail electricity markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C).
- Maman Setiawan, 2023. "Measuring the Competition Index in the Indonesian Manufacturing Industry: The Structure–Conduct–Performance Paradigm," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(15), pages 1-13, July.
- Sylwester Bejger, 2011. "Polish cement industry cartel - preliminary examination of collusion existence," Business and Economic Horizons (BEH), Prague Development Center, vol. 4(1), pages 88-107, January.
- Bejger, Sylwester, 2011. "Polish cement industry cartel- preliminary examination of collusion existence," Business and Economic Horizons (BEH), Prague Development Center (PRADEC), vol. 4(1), pages 1-20, January.
- Hunold, Matthias & Laitenberger, Ulrich & Licht, Georg & Nikogosian, Vigen & Stenzel, André & Ullrich, Hannes & Wolf, Christoph, 2011. "Modernisierung der Konzentrationsberichterstattung: Endbericht," ZEW Expertises, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, number 110525.
- Willem H. Boshoff & Rossouw van Jaarsveld, 2019. "Recurrent Collusion: Cartel Episodes and Overcharges in the South African Cement Market," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 54(2), pages 353-380, March.
- Korbinian Blanckenburg & Alexander Geist, 2011. "Detecting illegal activities: the case of cartels," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 15-33, August.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 2019.
"Price Caps as Welfare-Enhancing Coopetition,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 127(6), pages 3018-3069.
- Rey, Patrick & Tirole, Jean, 2013. "Price Caps as Welfare-Enhancing Coopetition," TSE Working Papers 13-439, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jan 2018.
- Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, 2019. "Price caps as welfare-enhancing coopetition," Post-Print hal-03270038, HAL.
- Juan Jiménez & Jordi Perdiguero, 2012.
"Does Rigidity of Prices Hide Collusion?,"
Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 41(3), pages 223-248, November.
- Juan Luis Jiménez & Jordi Perdiguero, 2011. "Does Rigidity of Prices Hide Collusion?," IREA Working Papers 201120, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised Oct 2011.
- Kyle Hampton & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2012.
"Demand shocks, capacity coordination, and industry performance: lessons from an economic laboratory,"
RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 43(1), pages 139-166, March.
- Kyle Hampton & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2010. "Demand Shocks, Capacity Coordination and Industry Performance: Lessons from Economic Laboratory," Working Papers 201023, University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Economics.
- Kyle Hampton & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2010. "Demand Shocks, Capacity Coordination and Industry Performance: Lessons from Economic Laboratory," Working Papers 2010-09, University of Alaska Anchorage, Department of Economics.
- Christos Genakos & Pantelis Koutroumpis & Mario Pagliero, 2018.
"The Impact of Maximum Markup Regulation on Prices,"
Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(2), pages 239-300, June.
- Christos Genakos & Pantelis Koutroumpis & Mario Pagliero, 2014. "The Impact of Maximum Markup Regulation on Prices," Working Papers 201412, Athens University Of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
- Christos Genakos & Pantelis Koutroumpis & Mario Pagliero, 2014. "The Impact of Maximum Markup Regulation on Prices," CEP Discussion Papers dp1310, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
- Christos Genakos & Pantelis Koutroumpis & Mario Pagliero, 2014. "The Impact of Maximum Markup Regulation on Prices," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 371, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
- Genakos, Christos & Koutroumpis, Pantelis & Pagliero, Mario, 2015. "The impact of maximum markup regulation on prices," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 60533, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Pagliero, Mario & Genakos, Christos & Koutroumpis, Pantelis, 2014. "The Impact of Maximum Markup Regulation on Prices," CEPR Discussion Papers 10243, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kets, Willemien & Kager, Wouter & Sandroni, Alvaro, 2022.
"The value of a coordination game,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
- Kets, Willemien & Kager, Wouter & Sandroni, Alvaro, 2021. "The Value of a Coordination Game," SocArXiv ymzrd, Center for Open Science.
- Kets, Willemien & Kager, Wouter & Sandroni, Alvaro, 2021. "The Value of a Coordination Game," CEPR Discussion Papers 16229, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Willemien Kets & Wouter Kager & Alvaro Sandroni, 2021. "The Value of the Coordination Game," Economics Series Working Papers 938, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- Porter, Robert H., 2020. "Mergers and coordinated effects," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
- Li Gan & Manuel A. Hernandez, 2013.
"Making Friends with Your Neighbors? Agglomeration and Tacit Collusion in The Lodging Industry,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(3), pages 1002-1017, July.
- Li Gan & Manuel A. Hernandez, 2011. "Making friends with your neighbors? Agglomeration and tacit collusion in the lodging industry," NBER Working Papers 16739, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ireland, Norman & Waterson, Michael, 2006.
"Cartels and Search,"
Economic Research Papers
269740, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Ireland, Norman & Waterson, Michael, 2006. "Cartels and Search," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 770, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Koski, Heli, 2018. "How Do Competition Policy and Data Brokers Shape Product Market Competition?," ETLA Working Papers 61, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
- Connor, John M., 2003.
"Private International Cartels: Effectiveness, Welfare, And Anticartel Enforcement,"
Staff Papers
28645, Purdue University, Department of Agricultural Economics.
- John M. Connor, 2003. "Private International Cartels: Effectiveness, Welfare, and Anticartel Enforcement," Working Papers 03-12, Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics.
- Mark Armstrong & Steffen Huck, 2010.
"Behavioral Economics as Applied to Firms: A Primer,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
2937, CESifo.
- Armstrong, Mark & Huck, Steffen, 2010. "Behavioral economics as applied to firms: a primer," MPRA Paper 20356, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Brown, David P. & Eckert, Andrew & Silveira, Douglas, 2023. "Screening for collusion in wholesale electricity markets: A literature review," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).
- Emmanuel Dechenaux & Dan Kovenock, 2011.
"Endogenous rationing, price dispersion and collusion in capacity constrained supergames,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 47(1), pages 29-74, May.
- Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Kovenock, Dan, 2003. "Endogenous Rationing, Price Dispersion, and Collusion in Capacity Constrained Supergames," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1164, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- Silveira, Douglas & Vasconcelos, Silvinha & Resende, Marcelo & Cajueiro, Daniel O., 2022.
"Won’t Get Fooled Again: A supervised machine learning approach for screening gasoline cartels,"
Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C).
- Douglas Silveira & Silvinha Vasconcelos & Marcelo Resende & Daniel O. Cajueiro, 2021. "Won't Get Fooled Again: A Supervised Machine Learning Approach for Screening Gasoline Cartels," CESifo Working Paper Series 8835, CESifo.
- Svetlana Avdasheva & Svetlana Golovanova & Gyuzel Yusupova, 2019. "Advance freight rate announcements (GRI) in liner shipping: European and Russian regulatory settlements compared," Maritime Economics & Logistics, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association of Maritime Economists (IAME), vol. 21(2), pages 192-206, June.
- Bolotova, Yuliya & Connor, John M. & Miller, Douglas J., 2008.
"The impact of collusion on price behavior: Empirical results from two recent cases,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1290-1307, November.
- Bolotova, Yuliya & Connor, John M. & Miller, Douglas J., 2005. "The Impact of Collusion on Price Behavior: Empirical Results from Two Recent Cases," 2005 Annual meeting, July 24-27, Providence, RI 19164, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
- Hans W. Friederiszick & Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, 2008. "Triggering Inspections Ex Officio: Moving Beyond A Passive Eu Cartel Policy," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 4(1), pages 89-113.
- Hüschelrath, Kai & Veith, Tobias, 2011. "The impact of cartelization on pricing dynamics: Evidence from the German cement industry," ZEW Discussion Papers 11-067, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Martin, Simon, 2020. "Market transparency and consumer search - Evidence from the German retail gasoline market," DICE Discussion Papers 350, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2005. "Detecting Cartels," Economics Working Paper Archive 526, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
More about this item
Keywords
cartel; cement; collusive marker; market screening; price fixing;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- L61 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Metals and Metal Products; Cement; Glass; Ceramics
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2005-11-12 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-CSE-2005-11-12 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-MIC-2005-11-12 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-REG-2005-11-12 (Regulation)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0511003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: EconWPA (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://econwpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.