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Screening markets for cartel detection - collusive marker in the CFD cartel-audit

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Author Info
Christian Lorenz (Institute of Public Economics, Muenster University)

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Abstract

Coordination Failure Diagnostics (CFD) is a model that analyses real market processes with the help of time pattern analysis and investigates whether they operate efficiently (See www.wiwi.uni-muenster.de/cfd). The CFD cartel-audit should enable the detection of cartels via characteristic market process patterns. This is based on the assumption that existing cartels cause failures in the observed process patterns. The CFD cartel-audit attempts to draw conclusions from these process patterns in order to find hidden cartels and to engage antitrust agencies into additional more detailed audits.

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File URL: http://129.3.20.41/eps/io/papers/0511/0511003.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Industrial Organization with number 0511003.

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Length: 13 pages
Date of creation: 09 Nov 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpio:0511003

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 13
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Web page: http://129.3.20.41

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Related research
Keywords: cartel; cement; collusive marker; market screening; price fixing;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
L61 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Metals and Metal Products; Cement; Glass; Ceramics
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2006. "What Determines Cartel Success?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(1), pages 43-95, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Asch, Peter & Seneca, Joseph J, 1975. "Characteristics of Collusive Firms," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 23(3), pages 223-37, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Harrington, Joseph Jr. & Chen, Joe, 2006. "Cartel pricing dynamics with cost variability and endogenous buyer detection," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(6), pages 1185-1212, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Abrantes-Metz, Rosa M. & Froeb, Luke M. & Geweke, John & Taylor, Christopher T., 2006. "A variance screen for collusion," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 467-486, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Robert Porter, 2005. "Detecting Collusion," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 147-167, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Kai-Uwe Kühn, 2001. "Fighting collusion by regulating communication between firms," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 16(32), pages 167-204, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Ivaldi, Marc & Jullien, Bruno & Rey, Patrick & Seabright, Paul & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "The Economics of Tacit Collusion," IDEI Working Papers 186, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  8. Osborne, Martin J & Pitchik, Carolyn, 1987. "Cartels, Profits and Excess Capacity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(2), pages 413-28, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2005. "Detecting Cartels," Economics Working Paper Archive 526, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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