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What Determines Cartel Success?

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Margaret C. Levenstein () (University of Massachusetts Amherst)
Valerie Y. Suslow ()
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Paper provided by University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2002-01.

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Date of creation: 21 Jan 2002
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Abreu, Dilip & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1986. "Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 251-269, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. D. F. Leach, 1994. "The South African Cement Cartel: A Critique of Fourie and Smith," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 62(3), pages 156-168, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Ian Domowitz & R. Glenn Hubbard & Bruce C. Petersen, 1986. "Business Cycles and the Relationship Between Concentration and Price-Cost Margins," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 1-17, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Mukesh Eswaran, 1997. "Cartel Unity over the Business Cycle," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(3), pages 644-72, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Grant, Hugh & Thille, Henry, 2001. "Tariffs, Strategy, And Structure: Competition And Collusion In The Ontario Petroleum Industry, 1870 1880," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 61(02), pages 390-413, August. [Downloadable!]
  6. Asch, Peter & Seneca, Joseph J, 1975. "Characteristics of Collusive Firms," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 23(3), pages 223-37, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Posner, Richard A, 1970. "A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(2), pages 365-419, October.
  8. Alexander, Barbara, 1994. "The Impact of the National Industrial Recovery Act on Cartel Formation and Maintenance Costs," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 76(2), pages 245-54, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Gallet, Craig & Schroeter, John, 2002. "The Effects of the Business Cycle on Oligopoly Coordination: Evidence from the U.S. Rayon Industry," Staff General Research Papers 5250, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  11. Lawrence White, 2001. "Lysine and Price Fixing: How Long? How Severe?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 23-31, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Granitz, Elizabeth & Klein, Benjamin, 1996. "Monopolization by "Raising Rivals' Costs": The Standard Oil Case," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 39(1), pages 1-47, April.
  13. Sproul, Michael F, 1993. "Antitrust and Prices," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 741-54, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Telser, Lester G, 1985. "Cooperation, Competition, and Efficiency," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(2), pages 271-95, May.
  15. Glenn Ellison, 1994. "Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 37-57, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Gupta, Bishnupriya, 1997. "Collusion in the Indian Tea Industry in the Great Depression: An Analysis of Panel Data," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 155-173, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Green, Edward J & Porter, Robert H, 1984. "Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 87-100, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  18. Fraas, Arthur G & Greer, Douglas F, 1977. "Market Structure and Price Collusion: An Empirical Analysis," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 26(1), pages 21-44, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. McGahan, A M, 1995. "Cooperation in Prices and Capacities: Trade Associations in Brewing after Repeal," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 521-59, October.
  20. Bosch, Jean-Claude & Eckard, E Woodrow, Jr, 1991. "The Profitability of Price Fixing: Evidence from Stock Market Reaction to Federal Indictments," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 73(2), pages 309-17, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Pirrong, Stephen Craig, 1992. "An Application of Core Theory to the Analysis of Ocean Shipping Markets," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 89-131, April.
  22. Berry, Steven & Briggs, Hugh, 1988. "A non-parametric test of a first-order Markov process for regimes in a non-cooperatively collusive industry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 73-77. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Gallet, Craig A, 1997. "Cyclical Fluctuations and Coordination in the US Steel Industry," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 29(3), pages 279-85, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Slade, Margaret E, 1989. "Price Wars in Price-Setting Supergames," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 56(223), pages 295-310, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Sjostrom, William, 1989. "Collusion in Ocean Shipping: A Test of Monopoly and Empty Core Model s," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1160-79, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  26. Margaret Levenstein, 1993. "Vertical Restraints in the Bromine Cartel: The Role of Distributors in Facilitating Collusion," NBER Historical Working Papers 0049, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  27. Robert H. Porter, 1983. "A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 301-314, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  28. Cooper, Russell & Haltiwanger, John, 1993. "Automobiles and the National Industrial Recovery Act: Evidence on Industry Complementarities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(4), pages 1043-71, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  29. Pindyck, Robert S, 1979. "The Cartelization of World Commodity Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(2), pages 154-58, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  30. Teece, David J. & Sunding, David & Mosakowski, Elaine, 1993. "Natural resource cartels," Handbook of Natural Resource and Energy Economics, in: A. V. Kneese† & J. L. Sweeney (ed.), Handbook of Natural Resource and Energy Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1131-1166 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  31. Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 390-407, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  32. Hay, George A & Kelley, Daniel, 1974. "An Empirical Survey of Price Fixing Conspiracies," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 13-38, April.
  33. F.C.v.N. FOURIE & A. SMITH, 1994. "The South African Cement Cartel: An Economic Evaluation," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 62(2), pages 80-93, 06. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. John Connor & C. Gustav Helmers, 2006. "Statistics On Modern Private International Cartels, 1990-2005," Working Papers 06-11, Purdue University, College of Agriculture, Department of Agricultural Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Kathryn Graddy & Orley Ashenfelter, 2004. "Anatomy of the Rise and Fall of a Price-Fixing Conspiracy: Auctions at Sotheby`s and Christie`s," Economics Series Working Papers 203, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Andersson, Ola, 2006. "Bargaining in Collusive Markets," Working Papers 2006:21, Lund University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. BOURJADE, Sylvain & REY, Patrick & SEABRIGHT, Paul, 2007. "Private Antitrust Enforcement in the Presence of Pre-Trial Bargaining," IDEI Working Papers 499, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  5. Buccirossi, Paolo & Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 2006. "Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers," CEPR Discussion Papers 5465, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Kyle Hyndman, 2005. "Status Quo Effects in Bargaining: An Empirical Analysis of OPEC," Industrial Organization 0511016, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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