Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Behavioral economics as applied to firms: a primer

Contents:

Author Info

  • Armstrong, Mark
  • Huck, Steffen

Abstract

We discuss the literatures on behavioral economics, bounded rationality and experimental economics as they apply to firm behavior in markets. Topics discussed include the impact of imitative and satisficing behavior by firms, outcomes when managers care about their position relative to peers, the benefits of employing managers whose objective diverges from profit-maximization (including managers who are overconfident or base pricing decisions on sunk costs), the impact of social preferences on the ability to collude, and the incentive for profit-maximizing firms to mimic irrational behavior.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/20356/
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 20356.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: Jan 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:20356

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Schackstr. 4, D-80539 Munich, Germany
Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2219
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-3900
Web page: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Behavioral economics; bounded rationality; experimental economics; oligopoly; antitrust;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Schipper, Burkhard C., 2005. "Imitators and Optimizers in Cournot Oligopoly," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University 53, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
  2. Nabil Al-Najjar & Sandeep Baliga & David Besanko, 2008. "Market forces meet behavioral biases: cost misallocation and irrational pricing," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 214-237.
  3. Oechssler, Jorg, 2002. "Cooperation as a result of learning with aspiration levels," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 405-409, November.
  4. Albaek, Svend & Mollgaard, Peter & Overgaard, Per B, 1997. "Government-Assisted Oligopoly Coordination? A Concrete Case," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(4), pages 429-43, December.
  5. Schaffer, Mark E., 1989. "Are profit-maximisers the best survivors? : A Darwinian model of economic natural selection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 29-45, August.
  6. Dejong, Douglas V. & Forsythe, Robert & Uecker, Wilfred C., 1988. "A note on the use of businessmen as subjects in sealed offer markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 87-100, January.
  7. Huck, Steffen & Oechssler, Jörg & Normann, Hans-Theo, 1999. "Through trial & error to collusion," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1999,57, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
  8. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., . "A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation," Chapters in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  9. Huck, Steffen & Normann, Hans-Theo & Oechssler, Jorg, 1999. "Learning in Cournot Oligopoly--An Experiment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(454), pages C80-95, March.
  10. Karl H. Schlag, . "Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi- Armed Bandits," ELSE working papers, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution 028, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
  11. Jose Apesteguia & Martin Dufwenberg & Reinhard Selten, 2007. "Blowing the Whistle," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 143-166, April.
  12. Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 1993. "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 612-43, August.
  13. Aviad Heifetz & Chris Shannon & Yossi Spiegel, 2005. "The Dynamic Evolution of Preferences," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1415, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. Massimo Motta & Michele Polo, . "Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," Working Papers 150, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  15. David B. Ridley, 2009. "Herding versus Hotelling: Market Entry with Costly Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000174, David K. Levine.
  16. Nolan Miller & Amit Pazgal, 2002. "Relative performance as a strategic commitment mechanism," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(2), pages 51-68.
  17. Plott, Charles R., 1989. "An updated review of industrial organization: Applications of experimental methods," Handbook of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 19, pages 1109-1176 Elsevier.
  18. De Long, J. Bradford & Shleifer, Andrei & Summers, Lawrence H. & Waldmann, Robert J., 1991. "The Survival of Noise Traders in Financial Markets," Scholarly Articles 3725470, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  19. Dufwenberg, Martin & Gneezy, Uri, 2000. "Price competition and market concentration: an experimental study," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 7-22, January.
  20. Vickers, John, 1985. "Delegation and the Theory of the Firm," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 95(380a), pages 138-47, Supplemen.
  21. Michael R. Baye & John Morgan, 2004. "Price Dispersion in the Lab and on the Internet: Theory and Evidence," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(3), pages 448-466, Autumn.
  22. Ivaldi, Marc & Jullien, Bruno & Rey, Patrick & Seabright, Paul & Tirole, Jean, 2003. "The Economics of Tacit Collusion," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 186, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  23. Bikhchandani, Sushil & Hirshleifer, David & Welch, Ivo, 1992. "A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change in Informational Cascades," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 992-1026, October.
  24. Hinloopen,Jeroen (ed.), 2009. "Experiments and Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521493420.
  25. Theo Offerman & Jan Potters & Joep Sonnemans, 1997. "Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 97-116/1, Tinbergen Institute.
  26. Robert Gibbons & Kevin Murphy, 1989. "Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers," Working Papers, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section. 628, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  27. Armstrong, Mark, 2008. "Interactions between competition and consumer policy," MPRA Paper 7258, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  28. Ulrike Malmendier & Geoffrey Tate, 2004. "CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment," NBER Working Papers 10807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  29. Dan Lovallo & Colin Camerer, 1999. "Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 306-318, March.
  30. Fernando Vega Redondo, 1996. "The evolution of walrasian behavior," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 1996-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  31. Andrew E. Clark & Paul Frijters & Michael A. Shields, 2008. "Relative Income, Happiness, and Utility: An Explanation for the Easterlin Paradox and Other Puzzles," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 46(1), pages 95-144, March.
  32. John A. List, 2004. "Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the Marketplace," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 72(2), pages 615-625, 03.
  33. Hirshleifer, David & Luo, Guo Ying, 2000. "On the Survival of Overconfident Traders in a Competitive Securities Market," MPRA Paper 15347, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  34. Mark Armstrong & John Vickers, 2010. "A Model of Delegated Project Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 78(1), pages 213-244, 01.
  35. Armen A. Alchian, 1950. "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 211.
  36. Jose Apesteguia & Steffen Huck & Jörg Oechssler, 2005. "Imitation - Theory and Experimental Evidence -," Working Papers, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics 0419, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics, revised Apr 2005.
  37. Simon, Herbert A, 1979. "Rational Decision Making in Business Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 69(4), pages 493-513, September.
  38. Georg Weizsacker, 2008. "Do we follow others when we should? A simple test of rational expectations," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library 4945, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  39. Steffen Huck & Hans-Theo Normann & Jörg Oechssler, 2001. "Two are Few and Four are Many: Number Effects in Experimental Oligopolies," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers, University of Bonn, Germany bgse12_2001, University of Bonn, Germany.
  40. Bigoni, Maria & Fort, Margherita, 2013. "Information and learning in oligopoly: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 192-214.
  41. Fershtman, Chaim & Judd, Kenneth L, 1987. "Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 77(5), pages 927-40, December.
  42. Malmendier, Ulrike & Tate, Geoffrey, 2008. "Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's reaction," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 20-43, July.
  43. Jeroen Hinloopen & Adriaan R. Soetevent, 2008. "Laboratory evidence on the effectiveness of corporate leniency programs," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(2), pages 607-616.
  44. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
  45. Conlisk, John, 1980. "Costly optimizers versus cheap imitators," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 275-293, September.
  46. John A. List, 2003. "Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 118(1), pages 41-71, February.
  47. Roll, Richard, 1986. "The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(2), pages 197-216, April.
  48. Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2001. "Stackelberg Beats Cournot: On Collusion and Efficiency in Experimental Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(474), pages 749-65, October.
  49. Feinberg, Robert M & Husted, Thomas A, 1993. "An Experimental Test of Discount-Rate Effects on Collusive Behaviour in Duopoly Markets," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 153-60, June.
  50. Levin, D., 1988. "Horizontal Mergers: The 50 Percent Bench-Mark," Papers, Houston - Department of Economics 19, Houston - Department of Economics.
  51. de Meza, David & Southey, Clive, 1996. "The Borrower's Curse: Optimism, Finance and Entrepreneurship," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(435), pages 375-86, March.
  52. Scharfstein, David S & Stein, Jeremy C, 1990. "Herd Behavior and Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 465-79, June.
  53. Schlag, Karl H., 1999. "Which one should I imitate?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 493-522, May.
  54. Huck, Steffen & Müller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2000. "Strategic delegation in experimental markets," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2000,39, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
  55. Banerjee, Abhijit V, 1992. "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 107(3), pages 797-817, August.
  56. Steffen Huck & Hans-Theo Normann & Joerg Oechssler, 2004. "Through Trial and Error to Collusion," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(1), pages 205-224, 02.
  57. Raymond Deneckere & Carl Davidson, 1985. "Incentives to Form Coalitions with Bertrand Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(4), pages 473-486, Winter.
  58. Bonanno, Giacomo & Vickers, John, 1988. "Vertical Separation," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 257-65, March.
  59. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
  60. Anand M. Goel & Anjan V. Thakor, 2010. "Do Envious CEOs Cause Merger Waves?," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(2), pages 487-517, February.
  61. Marianne Bertrand & Antoinette Schoar, 2003. "Managing With Style: The Effect Of Managers On Firm Policies," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 118(4), pages 1169-1208, November.
  62. Huck, Steffen & Normann, Hans-Theo & Oechssler, Jorg, 2000. "Does information about competitors' actions increase or decrease competition in experimental oligopoly markets?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 39-57, January.
  63. Steven D. Sklivas, 1987. "The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 18(3), pages 452-458, Autumn.
  64. Dixon, Huw David, 2000. "Keeping up with the Joneses: competition and the evolution of collusion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 223-238, October.
  65. Andersson, Ola & Wengström, Erik, 2004. "Do Antitrust Laws Facilitate Collusion? Experimental Evidence on Costly Communication in Duopolies," Working Papers, Lund University, Department of Economics 2004:14, Lund University, Department of Economics, revised 13 Sep 2004.
  66. Theo Offerman & Jan Potters, 2006. "Does Auctioning of Entry Licences Induce Collusion? An Experimental Study," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(3), pages 769-791.
  67. Douglas Gale & Hamid Sabourian, 2005. "Complexity and Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 73(3), pages 739-769, 05.
  68. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July.
  69. Doruk Iris & Luís Santos-Pinto, 2008. "Tacit Collusion under Fairness and Reciprocity," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP), Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP 09.03, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  70. David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1999. "Reputation and Imperfect Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 238, David K. Levine.
  71. Salant, Stephen W & Switzer, Sheldon & Reynolds, Robert J, 1983. "Losses from Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 185-99, May.
  72. Herbert Simon & Lindsay McSweeney, 2010. "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, Competition Policy International, vol. 6.
  73. Kyle, Albert S & Wang, F Albert, 1997. " Speculation Duopoly with Agreement to Disagree: Can Overconfidence Survive the Market Test?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 52(5), pages 2073-90, December.
  74. Eaton, Jonathan & Grossman, Gene M, 1986. "Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 101(2), pages 383-406, May.
  75. Rhode, Paul & Stegeman, Mark, 2001. "Non-Nash equilibria of Darwinian dynamics with applications to duopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 415-453, March.
  76. Steffen Huck & Kai A. Konrad & Wieland Müller & Hans-Theo Normann, 2007. "The Merger Paradox and why Aspiration Levels Let it Fail in the Laboratory," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(522), pages 1073-1095, 07.
  77. Forsythe Robert & Horowitz Joel L. & Savin N. E. & Sefton Martin, 1994. "Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 347-369, May.
  78. Schlag, Karl H., 1994. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution," Discussion Paper Serie B, University of Bonn, Germany 296, University of Bonn, Germany.
  79. Burdett, Kenneth & Judd, Kenneth L, 1983. "Equilibrium Price Dispersion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 955-69, July.
  80. Grossman, Sanford J & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Information and Competitive Price Systems," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 66(2), pages 246-53, May.
  81. Yun Joo Jung & John H. Kagel & Dan Levin, 1994. "On the Existence of Predatory Pricing: An Experimental Study of Reputation and Entry Deterrence in the Chain-Store Game," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 25(1), pages 72-93, Spring.
  82. Tanaka, Yasuhito, 2000. "Stochastically stable states in an oligopoly with differentiated goods: equivalence of price and quantity strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 235-253, October.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Blog mentions

As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
  1. Behavioral economics as applied to firms: a primer
    by Miguel in Simoleon Sense on 2010-07-11 00:16:41
  2. Behavioural Economics Applied to FIRMS
    by Liam Delaney in Geary Behaviour Centre on 2010-07-07 09:57:00
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. S.N. O'Higgins & Arturo Palomba & Patrizia Sbriglia, 2010. "Second Mover Advantage and Bertrand Dynamic Competition: An Experiment," Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory University of Siena, University of Siena 028, University of Siena.
  2. Ronald M. Harstad & Reinhard Selten, 2013. "Bounded-Rationality Models: Tasks to Become Intellectually Competitive," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 51(2), pages 496-511, June.
  3. Vincent P. Crawford, 2013. "Boundedly Rational versus Optimization-Based Models of Strategic Thinking and Learning in Games," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 51(2), pages 512-27, June.
  4. Luis Cabral, 2014. "We're Number 1: Price Wars for Market Share Leadership," Working Papers, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics 14-01, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  5. Folmer, Henk & Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 2011. "Does Environmental Economics Produce Aeroplanes Without Engines? - On the Need for an Environmental Social Science," Working Papers in Economics, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics 483, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
  6. Erik Ansink & Harold Houba, 2010. "Market Power in Water Markets," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 10-054/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 16 May 2011.
  7. Hinloopen, Jeroen & Müller, Wieland & Normann, Hans-Theo, 2014. "Output commitment through product bundling: Experimental evidence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 65(C), pages 164-180.
  8. Le Coq, Chloé & Sturluson, Jon Thor, 2012. "Does opponents’ experience matter? Experimental evidence from a quantity precommitment game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 84(1), pages 265-277.
  9. Miklós Antal & Ardjan Gazheli & Jeroen van den Bergh, 2012. "Behavioral Foundations of Sustainability Transitions," WWWforEurope Working Papers series, WWWforEurope 3, WWWforEurope.
  10. Cardella, Eric & Chiu, Ray, 2012. "Stackelberg in the lab: The effect of group decision making and “Cooling-off” periods," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(6), pages 1070-1083.
  11. Kyle Hampton & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2010. "Demand Shocks, Capacity Coordination and Industry Performance: Lessons from Economic Laboratory," Working Papers 2010-09, University of Alaska Anchorage, Department of Economics.
  12. James Cooper & William Kovacic, 2012. "Behavioral economics: implications for regulatory behavior," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 41-58, February.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:20356. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ekkehart Schlicht).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.