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A model of delegated project choice

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Author Info
Armstrong, Mark
Vickers, John

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Abstract

We present a model in which a principal delegates the choice of project to an agent with different preferences. The principal determines the set of projects from which the agent may choose. The principal can verify the characteristics of the project chosen by the agent, but does not know which other projects were available to the agent. We consider situations where the collection of available projects is exogenous to the agent but uncertain, where the principal cannot observe the agent's payoff, where the principal can pay the agent to choose a desirable project, and where the agent must invest effort to discover a project.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/8963/
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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/14161/
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 8963.

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Date of creation: 18 Mar 2009
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:8963

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Related research
Keywords: Delegation; principal-agent; rules; merger policy; hurdle rates;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Baker, George & Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1999. "Informal Authority in Organizations," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 56-73, April.
  2. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
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  3. Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof, 2007. "A Consumer Surplus Defense in Merger Control," Working Paper Series 686, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2006. "Continuity in mechanism design without transfers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 182-189, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Manuel Amador & Iván Werning & George-Marios Angeletos, 2006. "Commitment vs. Flexibility," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(2), pages 365-396, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Nahum D. Melumad & Toshiyuki Shibano, 1991. "Communication in Settings with No. Transfers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 173-198, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Armin Falk & Michael Kosfeld, 2006. "The Hidden Costs of Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1611-1630, December. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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