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The Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust

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  • Joseph Farrell
  • Michael Katz

Abstract

There has been considerable debate concerning whether consumer surplus or total surplus should be the welfare standard for antitrust. This debate misses two critical issues.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Competition Policy International in its journal CPI Journal CPI 2(2).

Volume (Year): 2 (2006)
Issue (Month): ()
Pages:

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Handle: RePEc:cpi:cpijrn:2.2.2006:i=4894

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Web page: https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com

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Cited by:
  1. Russell Pittman, 2007. "Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for Antitrust Enforcement," EAG Discussions Papers 200709, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
  2. John Vickers & Mark Armstrong, 2007. "A Model of Delegated Project Choice With Application to Merger Policy," Economics Series Working Papers 347, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  3. Armstrong, Mark & Vickers, John, 2008. "A model of delegated project choice," MPRA Paper 8963, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Fiammetta Gordon & David Squires, 2008. "The Deterrent Effect of UK Competition Enforcement," De Economist, Springer, vol. 156(4), pages 411-432, December.
  5. Louis Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, 2007. "Antitrust," NBER Working Papers 12867, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Bilotkach, Volodymyr & Hüschelrath, Kai, 2012. "Airline alliances and antitrust policy: The role of efficiencies," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 21(C), pages 76-84.
  7. Kamerbeek, S.P., 2009. "Merger Performance and Efficiencies in Horizontal Merger Policy in the US and the EU," MPRA Paper 18064, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Barros, Pedro P. & Hoernig, Steffen & Nilssen, Tore, 2008. "Keeping Both Eyes Wide Open: The Life of a Competitive Authority among Sectoral Regulators," Memorandum 12/2008, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  9. Pingping Shan & Guofu Tan & Simon Wilkie & Michael Williams, 2012. "China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: What is the Welfare Standard?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 31-52, August.
  10. Dennis W. Carlton, 2007. "Does Antitrust Need to be Modernized?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(3), pages 155-176, Summer.
  11. Oliver Budzinski, 2009. "Modern Industrial Economics and Competition Policy: Open Problems and Possible Limits," Working Papers 93/09, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
  12. Fumagalli, Eileen & Nilssen, Tore, 2008. "Waiting to Merge," Memorandum 13/2008, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  13. Marc Fusaro & Richard Ericson, 2010. "The Welfare Economics of “Bounce Protection” Programs," Journal of Consumer Policy, Springer, vol. 33(1), pages 55-73, March.
  14. Jarig Sinderen & Ron Kemp, 2008. "The Economic Effect Of Competition Law Enforcement: The Case Of The Netherlands," De Economist, Springer, vol. 156(4), pages 365-385, December.

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