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Continuity in mechanism design without transfers

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  • Martimort, David
  • Semenov, Aggey

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 93 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 182-189

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:93:y:2006:i:2:p:182-189

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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References

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  1. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
  2. V. Crawford & J. Sobel, 2010. "Strategic Information Transmission," Levine's Working Paper Archive 544, David K. Levine.
  3. Armstrong, M., 1994. "Delegation and discretion," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9421, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
  4. Alonso, Ricardo & Matouschek, Niko, 2005. "Optimal Delegation," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5289, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Nahum D. Melumad & Toshiyuki Shibano, 1991. "Communication in Settings with No. Transfers," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(2), pages 173-198, Summer.
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Cited by:
  1. Mark Armstrong & John Vickers, 2010. "A Model of Delegated Project Choice," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 78(1), pages 213-244, 01.
  2. Vincent Anesi & Daniel J. Seidmann, 2009. "Optimal Delegation with a Finite Number of States," Discussion Papers, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham 2009-20, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  3. Fleckinger, Pierre, 2008. "Bayesian improvement of the phantom voters rule: An example of dichotomic communication," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 1-13, January.
  4. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00586854 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2010. "Decision Rules for Experts with Opposing Interests," Working Papers, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance 674, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  6. Liang, Pinghan, 2013. "Optimal delegation via a strategic intermediary," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 15-30.
  7. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "The Informational Effects of Competition and Collusion in Legislative Politics," MPRA Paper 6989, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  8. Semenov, Aggey, 2012. "Delegation to potentially uninformed agent," MPRA Paper 42080, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Koessler, Frédéric & Martimort, David, 2012. "Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1850-1881.
  10. Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "Bargaining in the Appointment Process, Constrained Delegation and the Political Weight of the Senate," MPRA Paper 6988, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Aggey Semenov, 2012. "Delegation to a potentially uninformed agent," Working Papers, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics 1215E, University of Ottawa, Department of Economics.
  12. Salvatore Piccolo & Giovanni W. Puopolo & Luis Vasconcelos, 2013. "Non-Exclusive Financial Advice," CSEF Working Papers, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy 347, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
  13. Martimort, David & Stole, Lars, 2011. "Public Contracting in Delegated Agency Games," MPRA Paper 32874, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  14. Kremer, Ilan & Mansour, Yishay & Perry, Motty, 2013. "Implementing the "Wisdom of the Crowd"," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1024, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.

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