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The Informational Effects of Competition and Collusion in Legislative Politics

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  • Martimort, David
  • Semenov, Aggey

Abstract

We use a mechanism design approach to study the organization of interest groups in an informational model of lobbying. Interest groups influence the legislature only by communicating private information on their preferences and not by means of monetary transfers. Interest groups have private information on their ideal points in a one-dimensional policy space and may either compete or adopt more collusive behaviors. Optimal policies result from a trade-off between imposing rules which are non-responsive to the groups' preferences and flexibility that pleases groups better. Within a strong coalition, interest groups credibly share information which facilitates communication of their joint interests, helps screening by the legislature and induces flexible policies responsive to the groups' joint interests (an informativeness effect). Competing interest groups better transmit information on their individual preferences (a screening effect). The socially and privately optimal organization of lobbying favors competition between groups only when their preferences are not too congruent with those of the legislature. With more congruence, a strong coalition is preferred. Finally, within a weak coalition, interest groups must design incentive compatible collusive mechanisms to share information. Such weak coalitions are always inefficient.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 6989.

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Date of creation: 01 Feb 2008
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:6989

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Keywords: Communication Mechanisms; Lobbying; Competition; Coalition; Legislative Politics;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Koessler, Frédéric & Martimort, David, 2012. "Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1850-1881.
  2. Zapechelnyuk, Andriy, 2013. "Eliciting information from a committee," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 148(5), pages 2049-2067.
  3. Alonso, Ricardo & Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D, 2011. "Resource Allocation in the Brain," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 8408, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2013. "Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 62-70.
  5. Javier A. Prado Domínguez & Antonio García Lorenzo, 2010. "Competencia e incentivos a la cooperación en la interacción de grupos de interés que pretenden aumentar su influencia política directa: ¿cuál es la importancia de la presión política?," Hacienda Pública Española, IEF, IEF, vol. 192(1), pages 105-125, March.
  6. McGee, Andrew & Yang, Huanxing, 2013. "Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 181-191.
  7. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser, 2011. "Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS 205, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 04 Jul 2011.
  8. Tymofiy Mylovanov & Andriy Zapechelnyuk, 2010. "Decision Rules for Experts with Opposing Interests," Working Papers, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance 674, Queen Mary, University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
  9. Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Zapechelnyuk, Andriy, 2013. "Decision rules revealing commonly known events," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 119(1), pages 8-10.
  10. Kohei Kawamura, 2008. "Inequality, Happiness and Relative Concerns: What Actually is their Relationship?," ESE Discussion Papers, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh 182, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  11. Burnett, Johann Caro & Carrasco, Vinicius, 2011. "Coordination and the provision of incentives to a common regulated firm," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 606-627, September.

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