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Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics FAURE-GRIMAUD, Antoine
LAFFONT, Jean-Jacques
MARTIMORT, David
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Paper provided by Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse in its series IDEI Working Papers with number
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Date of creation: 2003Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Review of Economic Studies, vol. 70, n. 2, 2003, p. 253-280.Handle: RePEc:ide:wpaper:637Contact details of provider: Postal: Manufacture des Tabacs, Aile Jean-Jacques Laffont, 21 All�e de Brienne, 31000 TOULOUSE Phone: +33 (0)5 61 12 85 89 Fax: + 33 (0)5 61 12 86 37 Email: Web page: http://www.idei.fr/ More information through EDIRC
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Roland Kirstein, .
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Other versions: MARTIMORT, David & VERDIER, Thierry, 2003.
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DEQUIEDT, Vianney & MARTIMORT, David, 2004.
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265, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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Other versions: Celik, Gorkem, 2004.
"Mechanism Design with Collusive Supervision ,"
Micro Theory Working Papers
celik-04-09-13-05-42-19, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 27 Jan 2008.
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