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Fiscal Federalism, Local Public Works and Corruption

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Author Info
Besfamille, M.

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Abstract

In fiscal federal systems, local public works that generate spillovers are often financed by transfers from higher levels of government. In this article, we consider a governmental hierarchy composed by a Federal and a Local Government. The former delegates to the latter the task of finding a firm to undertake a local public work. As the Local Government has more information about the efficiency of the firm, it communicates its private information to the Federal Government which decides the way to fund the project.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by UNIVERSITE DE LIEGE, Faculte d'economie, de gestion et de sciences sociales, Groupe d'Etude des Mathematiques du Management et de l'Economie in its series Liege - Groupe d'Etude des Mathematiques du Management et de l'Economie with number 2000/01.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:gemame:2000/01

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Postal: UNIVERSITE DE LIEGE, Faculte d'economie, de gestion et de sciences sociales, Groupe d'Etude des Mathematiques du Management et de l'Economie. 4000 Liege, BELGIQUE
Web page: http://www.sig.egss.ulg.ac.be/gemme/
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Related research
Keywords: FEDERALISM ; PUBLIC POLICY ; CORRUPTION;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Cremer, Jaques & Estache, Antonio & Seabright, Paul & DEC, 1994. "The decentralization of public services : lessons from the theory of the firm," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1345, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  2. Melumad, Nahum & Mookherjee, Dilip & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1992. "A theory of responsibility centers," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 445-484, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-16.


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