In a typical corporate hierarchy, the manager is delegated the authority to make strategic decisions, and to contract with other employees. We study when such delegation can be optimal. In centralization, the owner retains the authority, which fails to motivate the manager to acquire valuable information, leading to suboptimal decisions and inefficient incentive provision to the worker. Beneficial delegation should necessarily motivate the manager to acquire information, which is possible only when the authority is delegated to the manager. We also document comparative statics results regarding the benefits of delegation and discuss when delegation is more likely to dominate centralization.
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Paper provided by Monash University, Department of Economics in its series Monash Economics Working Papers with number
19/08.
Find related papers by JEL classification: C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
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