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The Organization of Delegated Expertise Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Gromb, Denis
Martimort, David
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Paper provided by Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse in its series IDEI Working Papers with number
284.
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Date of creation: May 2004Date of revision:
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Christian Laux, 2001.
"Delegated Information Acquisition and Capital Budgeting: On the Separation of Project Evaluation and Project Management ,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) ,
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Robert A. J. Dur & Otto H. Swank, 2003.
"Producing and Manipulating Information ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
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Other versions: Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1997.
"Information Management in Incentive Problems ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(4), pages 796-821, August.
Marco Ottaviani & Peter Sorensen, 1999.
"Professional Advice ,"
Game Theory and Information
9906003, EconWPA.
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Other versions: Osband, Kent, 1989.
"Optimal Forecasting Incentives ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1091-1112, October.
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Richard A. Lambert, 1986.
"Executive Effort and Selection of Risky Projects ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(1), pages 77-88, Spring.
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Maskin, Eric, 1999.
"Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 23-38, January.
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Other versions: James Malcomson, 2004.
"Principal and Expert Agent ,"
Economics Series Working Papers
193, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
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Other versions: Fahad Khalil & Doyoung Kim & Dongsoo Shin, 2006.
"Optimal Task Design: To Integrate or Separate Planning and Implementation? ,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 15(2), pages 457-478, 06.
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Other versions: Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991.
"Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design ,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
Baron, David P & Besanko, David, 1999.
"Informational Alliances ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(4), pages 743-68, October.
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Boot, Arnoud W A, 1992.
" Why Hang on to Losers? Divestitures and Takeovers ,"
Journal of Finance ,
American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1401-23, September.
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Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2001.
"A Model Of Expertise ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
MIT Press, vol. 116(2), pages 747-775, May.
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Other versions:
Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999.
"A Model of Expertise ,"
Working Papers
154, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics..
[Downloadable!] Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999.
"A Model of Expertise ,"
Game Theory and Information
9902003, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!] Krishna, V. & Morgan, J., 1999.
"A Model of Expertise ,"
Papers
206, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982.
"Strategic Information Transmission ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November.
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Laux, Christian, 2001.
"Limited-Liability and Incentive Contracting with Multiple Projects ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(3), pages 514-26, Autumn.
Mookherjee, Dilip, 1984.
"Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents ,"
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Bengt Holmstrom, 1979.
"Moral Hazard and Observability ,"
Bell Journal of Economics ,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring.
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Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carillo, 2005.
"A Theory of Influence: The Strategic Value of Public Ignorance ,"
IEPR Working Papers
05.9, Institute of Economic Policy Research (IEPR).
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Dezsö Szalay & Ramon Arean, 2005.
"Communicating with a Team of Experts ,"
Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP)
05.12, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
[Downloadable!]
Di Maggio, Marco, 2009.
"Accountability and Cheap Talk ,"
MPRA Paper
18652, University Library of Munich, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
Brocas, Isabelle & Carrillo, Juan D, 2005.
"A Theory of Influence: The Strategic Value of Public Ignorance ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
4907, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Isabelle Brocas & Juan D. Carrillo, 2005.
"A Theory of Influence: The Strategic Value of Public Ignorance ,"
Levine's Bibliography
172782000000000068, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Bourjade, Sylvain, 2002.
"Diversification of Investor's Expertise in IPOs [Information diversification prior to an IPO] ,"
MPRA Paper
7259, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Dec 2007.
[Downloadable!]
Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008.
"The Informational Effects of Competition and Collusion in Legislative Politics ,"
MPRA Paper
6989, University Library of Munich, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Casamatta, Catherine & Haritchabalet, Carole, 2007.
"Experience, Screening and Syndication in Venture Capital Investments ,"
IDEI Working Papers
443, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Grigorieva, Elena & Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Müller, Rudolf & Vermeulen, Dries, 2006.
"The family of c-bisection auctions: efficiency and running time ,"
Research Memoranda
019, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
[Downloadable!]
Semenov, Aggey & Martimort, David, 2004.
"Communication by Interest Groups and the Organization of Lobbying ,"
MPRA Paper
8519, University Library of Munich, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
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