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Cooperation as a result of learning with aspiration levels

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  • Oechssler, Jorg

Abstract

It is shown that a win-stay, lose-hift behavior rule with endogenous aspiration levels yields cooperation in a certain class of games. The aspiration level in each round equals the current population average. The class of games includes the prisoner's dilemma and Cournot oligopoly and thus yields an explanation for cooperation and collusion.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization.

Volume (Year): 49 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
Pages: 405-409

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:49:y:2002:i:3:p:405-409

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References

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  1. T. Borgers & R. Sarin, 2010. "Naïve Reinforcement Learning With Endogenous Aspirations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 381, David K. Levine.
  2. Fernando Vega-Redondo, 1997. "The Evolution of Walrasian Behavior," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(2), pages 375-384, March.
  3. Samuelson Larry, 1994. "Stochastic Stability in Games with Alternative Best Replies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 35-65, October.
  4. Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January.
  5. Kandori, M. & Mailath, G.J., 1991. "Learning, Mutation, And Long Run Equilibria In Games," Papers 71, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - John M. Olin Program.
  6. Debraj Ray & Dilip Mookherjee & Fernando Vega Redondo & Rajeeva L. Karandikar, 1996. "Evolving aspirations and cooperation," Working Papers. Serie AD 1996-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  7. Dixon, Huw David, 2000. "Keeping up with the Joneses: competition and the evolution of collusion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 223-238, October.
  8. M. Posch & A. Pichler & K. Sigmund, 1998. "The Efficiency of Adapting Aspiration Levels," Working Papers ir98103, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
  9. Steffen Huck & Hans-Theo Normann & Joerg Oechssler, 1997. "Learning in Cournot Oligopoly - An Experiment," Game Theory and Information 9707009, EconWPA, revised 22 Jul 1997.
  10. K. Schlag, 2010. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution," Levine's Working Paper Archive 454, David K. Levine.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Carlos Alós-Ferrer, 2001. "Cournot versus Walras in Dynamic Oligopolies with Memory," Vienna Economics Papers 0110, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  2. Armstrong, Mark & Huck, Steffen, 2010. "Behavioral economics as applied to firms: a primer," MPRA Paper 20356, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Miklós Antal & Ardjan Gazheli & Jeroen van den Bergh, 2012. "Behavioral Foundations of Sustainability Transitions," WWWforEurope Working Papers series 3, WWWforEurope.
  4. Altavilla, Carlo & Luini, Luigi & Sbriglia, Patrizia, 2006. "Social learning in market games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 61(4), pages 632-652, December.
  5. Dixon, Huw D. & Sbriglia, Patrizia & Somma, Ernesto, 2006. "Learning to collude: An experiment in convergence and equilibrium selection in oligopoly," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(3), pages 155-167, September.
  6. MacLeod, W. Bentley & Pingle, Mark, 2005. "Aspiration uncertainty: its impact on decision performance and process," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 56(4), pages 617-629, April.
  7. Golosnoy, Vasyl & Okhrin, Yarema, 2008. "General uncertainty in portfolio selection: A case-based decision approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(3-4), pages 718-734, September.
  8. Robert S. Gazzale, 2009. "Learning to Play Nash from the Best," Department of Economics Working Papers 2009-03, Department of Economics, Williams College.
  9. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2002:i:3:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
  10. Steffen Huck & Philippe Jehiel, 2004. "Public statistics and private experience : Varying feedback information in a take or pass game," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000733, UCLA Department of Economics.
  11. Arieli, Itai & Babichenko, Yakov, 2012. "Average testing and Pareto efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2376-2398.
  12. Steffen Huck & Brian Wallace, 2002. "Reciprocal strategies and aspiration levels in a Cournot-Stackelberg experiment," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(3), pages 1-7.

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